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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id e67si18434774plb.107.2019.03.26.11.30.13; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:30:28 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20161025 header.b="qYJW/xs+"; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732638AbfCZS2M (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:28:12 -0400 Received: from mail-ot1-f73.google.com ([209.85.210.73]:51787 "EHLO mail-ot1-f73.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732622AbfCZS2L (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:28:11 -0400 Received: by mail-ot1-f73.google.com with SMTP id y19so8831000otk.18 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:28:10 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=DR3rBb2V8Dk77n+84nIF0+Znm0UqE9/8zaxdQ5CO2lo=; b=qYJW/xs+nLDcVGGTYVEVD05T/qerxpSxu5bGyCDyqRIN2PQcO/8rizPMkEG5e9Q/K0 SFoDzqGhV+38csuM69grnxhhFT4BiwC+wwvUHZrsP2a+ElcfMDnOkJdguaVu2IjpjD0s 4wPlkPUTr2mESbl6ovuAdSF4bYbUZGmG7/erzjPE1iAdak1g83oCJZUEO6DVBhoUeB9z cw9AEgwlYCfHOS4TfzcHpZ+K9aDyCNS0FK2N4LaxlfjnZiVI0S8KvIXG+PGcu3zB6ILk JFIPhAeLRMIB8hYAG10DKu4KsQCQcgb5ie1C+bK/xLY0vr2tSMWjeAQxgrNQBlYjpf4B HH6g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=DR3rBb2V8Dk77n+84nIF0+Znm0UqE9/8zaxdQ5CO2lo=; b=NWbfX1BQW5HDEEkgWJSkeGHyr9FyfUrMWvUssfPebIyjVq1arlESd20HNEUCsaFdtK o8Ui2K2Ho/e5jYrs+YUvDJO7vUfZQoOTye/2ozuCxFg5z2UmAmqI1pZ8FI/l0vcEvYun FlG7bA2ImVsW8KDWBDf8c4vIBvQrisRafzziH4LSS1KxIEfy1ymbIgTApDGekT81U3VA U7IEzfpeoaoz8rHDX3OMFHPpUiKOQ/J/d6XstUMWCP5TmG86xotGdnsg6g1u4W0zbdX4 Azz/oTS83YL+HJ3PCrXytOxovDuhBGDvcT5OC5MaiZjkZtNS+kcC6/UDGWAu8udsWnxF jXwQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU0z5DBYwS5p8ZUGYKkMq5UakBMM4Twdi2V8gNn1e5IJ0FKJzZJ oF4q4p4E77pOSWigEpFbA0Paf1sNGqfjv2zmRQacLQ== X-Received: by 2002:a9d:76cb:: with SMTP id p11mr8330720otl.248.1553624890542; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:28:10 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:27:22 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190326182742.16950-7-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Jiri Bohac , Matthew Garrett , kexec@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Jiri Bohac This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. [Modified by David Howells such that: (1) verify_pefile_signature() differentiates between no-signature and sig-didn't-match in its returned errors. (2) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED and logs an appropriate message if signature checking is enforced and an signature is not found, uses unsupported crypto or has no matching key. (3) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED if there is a signature for which we have a key, but signature doesn't match - even if in non-forcing mode. (4) kexec fails with EBADMSG or some other error if there is a signature which cannot be parsed - even if in non-forcing mode. (5) kexec fails with ELIBBAD if the PE file cannot be parsed to extract the signature - even if in non-forcing mode. ] Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++- include/linux/kexec.h | 4 +-- kernel/kexec_file.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 4b4a7f32b68e..735d04a4b18f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2016,20 +2016,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE -config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" depends on KEXEC_FILE ---help--- - This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for - the kexec_file_load() syscall. - In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid + signature of the kernel image. The image can still be loaded without + a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if + there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid. + + In addition to this option, you need to enable signature verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. +config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE + bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_SIG + ---help--- + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support" - depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG + depends on KEXEC_SIG depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING ---help--- diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index d178650fd524..4473cea1e877 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) { pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n"); - return -EKEYREJECTED; + return -ENODATA; } chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, @@ -408,6 +408,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust * keyring, or: * + * (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present. + * * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a * chain. * diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h index b9b1bc5f9669..58b27c7bdc2b 100644 --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ typedef void *(kexec_load_t)(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long cmdline_len); typedef int (kexec_cleanup_t)(void *loader_data); -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG typedef int (kexec_verify_sig_t)(const char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len); #endif @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ struct kexec_file_ops { kexec_probe_t *probe; kexec_load_t *load; kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig; #endif }; diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index f1d0e00a3971..67f3a866eabe 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image); } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len) { @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, const char __user *cmdline_ptr, unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags) { - int ret = 0; + const char *reason; + int ret; void *ldata; loff_t size; @@ -207,15 +208,48 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, if (ret) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, image->kernel_buf_len); - if (ret) { - pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n"); +#else + ret = -ENODATA; +#endif + + switch (ret) { + case 0: + break; + + /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not + * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there + * must be a valid signature. + */ + case -ENODATA: + reason = "kexec of unsigned image"; + goto decide; + case -ENOPKG: + reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto"; + goto decide; + case -ENOKEY: + reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key"; + decide: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { + pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason); + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; + break; + + /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable + * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures + * aren't required. + */ + default: + pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); goto out; } - pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n"); -#endif + /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, -- 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog