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From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To:     linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@redhat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, sgrubb@redhat.com,
        omosnace@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, serge@hallyn.com,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, mjg59@google.com,
        Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH ghak109 V2] audit: link integrity evm_write_xattrs record to syscall event
Date:   Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:49:20 -0400
Message-Id: <087489b21e50bcda65c6af3e038394d5bfe09e00.1553626080.git.rgb@redhat.com>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

In commit fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of
verified xattrs"), the call to audit_log_start() is missing a context to
link it to an audit event. Since this event is in user context, add
the process' syscall context to the record.

In addition, the orphaned keyword "locked" appears in the record.
Normalize this by changing it to logging the locking string "." as any
other user input in the "xattr=" field.

Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/109

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
---
Changelog:
v2
- switch from "(locked)" to printing the "." verbatim, untrusted.

 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 015aea8fdf1e..3f7cbb238923 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (count > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
 		return -E2BIG;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
+	ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+			     AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
 	if (!ab)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -214,6 +215,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (len && xattr->name[len-1] == '\n')
 		xattr->name[len-1] = '\0';
 
+	audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
+
 	if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
 		evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
 		newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
@@ -222,15 +226,11 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		inode_lock(inode);
 		err = simple_setattr(evm_xattrs, &newattrs);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
-		audit_log_format(ab, "locked");
 		if (!err)
 			err = count;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
-
 	if (strncmp(xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 		    XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
-- 
1.8.3.1