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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 60si21419820plf.122.2019.03.27.12.33.29; Wed, 27 Mar 2019 12:33:44 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=DsJnzbm1; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732046AbfC0SDK (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 27 Mar 2019 14:03:10 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:43188 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731851AbfC0SDI (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Mar 2019 14:03:08 -0400 Received: from sasha-vm.mshome.net (c-73-47-72-35.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.47.72.35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 552D121734; Wed, 27 Mar 2019 18:03:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1553709786; bh=D5j9uqe7RjbpQnE4BIvdicEPeFYyYV+xlNv76Q1lI2M=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=DsJnzbm1snkO95BkN0CXj+Xg5gm+I7k5d0PNxXbK+obcjeqwPM5L1cFbf2bxOsY9w Fe1+A+SCB745Ax+lYD0RDqpVAUhNV6AWm6aBMXvTLE8Wxp3K5gdYw1DE9ilceJVEeC xr1vhop358u32FwfRgH+qd2Kq/ub1hdrIDk0yZBo= From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vlastimil Babka , Alexander Potapenko , Dmitry Vyukov , Andrea Arcangeli , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Michal Hocko , David Rientjes , Yisheng Xie , zhong jiang , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds , Sasha Levin , linux-mm@kvack.org Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.0 037/262] mm, mempolicy: fix uninit memory access Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 13:58:12 -0400 Message-Id: <20190327180158.10245-37-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20190327180158.10245-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20190327180158.10245-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Vlastimil Babka [ Upstream commit 2e25644e8da4ed3a27e7b8315aaae74660be72dc ] Syzbot with KMSAN reports (excerpt): ================================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384 CPU: 1 PID: 17420 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #15 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295 mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline] mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384 update_tasks_nodemask+0x608/0xca0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1120 update_nodemasks_hier kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1185 [inline] update_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1253 [inline] cpuset_write_resmask+0x2a98/0x34b0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1728 ... Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmem_cache_alloc+0x572/0xb90 mm/slub.c:2777 mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:276 [inline] do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1180 [inline] kernel_mbind+0x8a7/0x31a0 mm/mempolicy.c:1347 __do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1354 [inline] As it's difficult to report where exactly the uninit value resides in the mempolicy object, we have to guess a bit. mm/mempolicy.c:353 contains this part of mpol_rebind_policy(): if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask)) "mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)" is testing pol->flags, which I couldn't ever see being uninitialized after leaving mpol_new(). So I'll guess it's actually about accessing pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed on line 354, but still part of statement starting on line 353. For w.cpuset_mems_allowed to be not initialized, and the nodes_equal() reachable for a mempolicy where mpol_set_nodemask() is called in do_mbind(), it seems the only possibility is a MPOL_PREFERRED policy with empty set of nodes, i.e. MPOL_LOCAL equivalent, with MPOL_F_LOCAL flag. Let's exclude such policies from the nodes_equal() check. Note the uninit access should be benign anyway, as rebinding this kind of policy is always a no-op. Therefore no actual need for stable inclusion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a71997c3-e8ae-a787-d5ce-3db05768b27c@suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/73da3e9c-cc84-509e-17d9-0c434bb9967d@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka Reported-by: syzbot+b19c2dc2c990ea657a71@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Yisheng Xie Cc: zhong jiang Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/mempolicy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c index ee2bce59d2bf..846f80e212ac 100644 --- a/mm/mempolicy.c +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static void mpol_rebind_policy(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *newmask) { if (!pol) return; - if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && + if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && !(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL) && nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask)) return; -- 2.19.1