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Date:   Thu, 28 Mar 2019 09:16:48 +0300
From:   Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 10/10] integrity: support EC-RDSA signatures for
 asymmetric_verify
Message-ID: <20190328061648.knexdusdcadubeu6@altlinux.org>
Mail-Followup-To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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 <1553710220.4608.9.camel@linux.ibm.com>
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On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 04:21:07PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> > > > index d775e03fbbcc..99080871eb9f 100644
> > > > --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> > > > +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
> > > > @@ -104,9 +104,16 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
> > > >  
> > > >  	memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks));
> > > >  
> > > > -	pks.pkey_algo = "rsa";
> > > >  	pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo];
> > > > -	pks.encoding = "pkcs1";
> > > > +	if (hdr->hash_algo == HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_256 ||
> > > > +	    hdr->hash_algo == HASH_ALGO_STREEBOG_512) {
> > > > +		/* EC-RDSA and Streebog should go together. */
> > > > +		pks.pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
> > > > +		pks.encoding = "raw";
> > > 
> > > IMA signatures are stored as xattrs, making them persistent. ?Support
> > > for streebog was upstreamed in linux-5.0. ?This change would break
> > > existing systems using streebog. ?As long as this is not yet a concern
> > 
> > In what sense it would break systems?
> 
> For example, if executable files are currently labeled with
> rsa/streebog signatures, then enforcing file data integrity I assume
> would break if the kernel uses ecrdsa/streebog.

Ah. No, I did not implement RSA(Streebog) intentionally, since Streebog is
not in the list of permitted hashes for PKCS1. You may notice this by the
lack of appropriate rsa_asn1_template[] entry.

Thanks,

> 
> Mimi
> 
> > 
> > Unless kernel crashes or signature is recognized as valid, I think, it should
> > not be called a break.
> > 
> > > Reviewed-by: ?Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > 
> > Thanks!
> > 
> > > 
> > > > +	} else {
> > > > +		pks.pkey_algo = "rsa";
> > > > +		pks.encoding = "pkcs1";
> > > > +	}
> > > >  	pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
> > > >  	pks.digest_size = datalen;
> > > >  	pks.s = hdr->sig;
> >