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R. Silva" , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 5.0 054/146] ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 19:01:06 +0200 Message-Id: <20190401170053.196644960@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190401170048.449559024@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190401170048.449559024@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 2b1d9c8f87235f593826b9cf46ec10247741fff9 upstream. info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(str return -ENXIO; if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1) return -EINVAL; + info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2); pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream]; if (pstr->substream_count == 0) return -ENOENT;