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R. Silva" , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 4.14 064/107] ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 19:02:19 +0200 Message-Id: <20190401170051.510206951@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190401170045.246405031@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190401170045.246405031@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit c709f14f0616482b67f9fbcb965e1493a03ff30b upstream. dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c @@ -617,13 +617,14 @@ int snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev, struct synth_info *inf) { struct seq_oss_synth *rec; + struct seq_oss_synthinfo *info = get_synthinfo_nospec(dp, dev); - if (dev < 0 || dev >= dp->max_synthdev) + if (!info) return -ENXIO; - if (dp->synths[dev].is_midi) { + if (info->is_midi) { struct midi_info minf; - snd_seq_oss_midi_make_info(dp, dp->synths[dev].midi_mapped, &minf); + snd_seq_oss_midi_make_info(dp, info->midi_mapped, &minf); inf->synth_type = SYNTH_TYPE_MIDI; inf->synth_subtype = 0; inf->nr_voices = 16;