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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id y9si2869935pgh.55.2019.04.02.07.40.28; Tue, 02 Apr 2019 07:40:43 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731284AbfDBNko (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 2 Apr 2019 09:40:44 -0400 Received: from shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk ([88.96.1.126]:43782 "EHLO shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731383AbfDBNkN (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Apr 2019 09:40:13 -0400 Received: from [167.98.27.226] (helo=deadeye) by shadbolt.decadent.org.uk with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1hBJe6-0002ny-Sk; Tue, 02 Apr 2019 14:40:11 +0100 Received: from ben by deadeye with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1hBJdw-0004vH-Va; Tue, 02 Apr 2019 14:40:00 +0100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov , "Takashi Iwai" , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2019 14:38:27 +0100 Message-ID: X-Mailer: LinuxStableQueue (scripts by bwh) X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Subject: [PATCH 3.16 60/99] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities In-Reply-To: X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 167.98.27.226 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ben@decadent.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on shadbolt.decadent.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.65-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" commit 5ae4f61f012a097df93de2285070ec8e34716d29 upstream. ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1001,6 +1002,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); if (ipcm->channels > 32) return -EINVAL; pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; @@ -1047,6 +1050,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; mutex_lock(&emu->fx8010.lock); spin_lock_irq(&emu->reg_lock);