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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id k12si15113151plt.28.2019.04.05.04.04.25; Fri, 05 Apr 2019 04:04:40 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730936AbfDELCu (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 5 Apr 2019 07:02:50 -0400 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:46052 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730497AbfDELCu (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2019 07:02:50 -0400 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D07E516A3; Fri, 5 Apr 2019 04:02:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from e103592.cambridge.arm.com (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3362A3F557; Fri, 5 Apr 2019 04:02:48 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 12:02:45 +0100 From: Dave Martin To: Amit Daniel Kachhap Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Marc Zyngier , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Kristina Martsenko , kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, Ramana Radhakrishnan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 6/9] KVM: arm64: Add vcpu feature flags to control ptrauth accessibility Message-ID: <20190405110245.GT3567@e103592.cambridge.arm.com> References: <1554172037-4516-1-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> <1554172037-4516-7-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1554172037-4516-7-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Apr 02, 2019 at 07:57:14AM +0530, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote: > Since Pointer authentication will be enabled or disabled on a > per-vcpu basis, vcpu feature flags are added in order to know which > vcpus have it enabled from userspace. > > This features will allow the KVM guest to allow the handling of > pointer authentication instructions or to treat them as undefined > if not set. > > The helper macro added checks the feature flag along with other > conditions such as VHE mode present and system support for > pointer address/generic authentication. Can this patch be put after the context switch patch instead? Here, we accept a request from userspace to enable ptrauth, but it will mysteriously fail to work. I worked around a similar issue by defining KVM_ARM64_GUEST_HAS_SVE early in the SVE series, but putting the logic to set this flag in vcpu->arch.flags later on (see also comments about this below). > Necessary documentations are added to reflect the changes done. > > Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap > Cc: Mark Rutland > Cc: Marc Zyngier > Cc: Christoffer Dall > Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu > --- > > Changes since v7: > * Moved the check for userspace features in this patch [James Morse]. > * Moved the vcpu feature flags Documentation in this patch [James Morse]. > > Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt | 13 +++++++++---- > Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 4 ++++ > arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 +++++++- > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 2 ++ > arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 7 +++++++ > 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt > index 5baca42..b164886 100644 > --- a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt > +++ b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt > @@ -87,7 +87,12 @@ used to get and set the keys for a thread. > Virtualization > -------------- > > -Pointer authentication is not currently supported in KVM guests. KVM > -will mask the feature bits from ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, and attempted use of > -the feature will result in an UNDEFINED exception being injected into > -the guest. > +Pointer authentication is enabled in KVM guest when each virtual cpu is > +initialised by passing flags KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_[ADDRESS/GENERIC] and > +requesting these two separate cpu features to be enabled. The current KVM > +guest implementation works by enabling both features together, so both these > +userspace flags are checked together before enabling pointer authentication. > +The separate userspace flag will allow to have no userspace ABI changes when > +both features are implemented in an isolated way in future. Nit: we might make this change, but we don't promise that it will happsen. So, maybe write: "[...] have no userspace ABI changes if support is added in the future to allow these two features to be enabled independently of one another." > + > +Pointer Authentication is supported in KVM guest only in VHE mode. > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > index 7de9eee..aaa048d 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt > @@ -2659,6 +2659,10 @@ Possible features: > Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI_0_2. > - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3: Emulate PMUv3 for the CPU. > Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PMU_V3. > + - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS: Enables Address Pointer authentication > + for the CPU and supported only on arm64 architecture. We should probably add: Must be requested if KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC is also requested. > + - KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC: Enables Generic Pointer authentication > + for the CPU and supported only on arm64 architecture. Similarly: Must be requested if KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS is also requested. (Or otherwise explain that both features must enabled together or not at all.) > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h > index e3ccd7b..9dd2918 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h > @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ > > #define KVM_MAX_VCPUS VGIC_V3_MAX_CPUS > > -#define KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES 4 > +#define KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES 6 > > #define KVM_REQ_SLEEP \ > KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(0, KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP) > @@ -491,6 +491,12 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_requires_vhe(void) > return false; > } > > +#define vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu) (has_vhe() && \ > + system_supports_address_auth() && \ > + system_supports_generic_auth() && \ > + test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, vcpu->arch.features) && \ > + test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features)) We're checking 5 things here, which we don't necessarily want to do every time. Is this used on any hot path? This kind of thing is one reason why I added vcpu->arch.flags: we can make the policy decision about whether to set the flag in kvm_reset_vcpu(), then afterwards we only need to check the flag. > + > static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {} > static inline void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm) {} > static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h > index 97c3478..8806f71 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h > @@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ struct kvm_regs { > #define KVM_ARM_VCPU_EL1_32BIT 1 /* CPU running a 32bit VM */ > #define KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2 2 /* CPU uses PSCI v0.2 */ > #define KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3 3 /* Support guest PMUv3 */ > +#define KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS 4 /* VCPU uses address authentication */ > +#define KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC 5 /* VCPU uses generic authentication */ > > struct kvm_vcpu_init { > __u32 target; > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c > index f16a5f8..717afed 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c > @@ -128,6 +128,13 @@ int kvm_reset_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > if (loaded) > kvm_arch_vcpu_put(vcpu); > > + if (test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, vcpu->arch.features) || > + test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features)) { > + /* Verify that KVM startup matches the conditions for ptrauth */ > + if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) > + goto out; > + } > + This looks like it works, but I find the way vcpu->arch.features is used in two different ways at the same time a bit confusing. Cheers ---Dave