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From:   Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
To:     Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc:     Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] docs: speculation.txt: mark example blocks as such
Date:   Wed, 10 Apr 2019 06:56:27 -0300
Message-Id: <793a3b0103b2d91e4bf850849f9de76cee3273a9.1554889999.git.mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
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Identify the example blocks there, in order to avoid Sphinx
warnings.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
---
 Documentation/speculation.txt | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/speculation.txt b/Documentation/speculation.txt
index e9e6cbae2841..50d7ea857cff 100644
--- a/Documentation/speculation.txt
+++ b/Documentation/speculation.txt
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ observed to extract secret information.
 
 For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds
 checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the
-following code:
+following code::
 
 	int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
 	{
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ following code:
 			return array[index];
 	}
 
-Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:
+Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as::
 
 	CMP	<index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS
 	B.LT	less
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured.
 
 More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may
 result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following
-code, building on the prior example:
+code, building on the prior example::
 
 	int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index)
 	{
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index
 value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation
 conditions.
 
-This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:
+This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example::
 
 	int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index)
 	{
-- 
2.20.1