Received: by 2002:a25:4158:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id o85csp2467868yba; Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:15:42 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzLCmUR/MA1ndVNnn/VbSzR8Kd+Bcj5rDEZG4Jlf1IhStiGEnL5KeNs4rW1/eLRm5m6bZnz X-Received: by 2002:aa7:87c5:: with SMTP id i5mr72264529pfo.20.1555355741858; Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:15:41 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1555355741; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=cTAjiSy3BiXWfhT0weEJY2DyttvXBeLs07+LDbmiIQVoNxOEWMUyK+DUQYwJRP9m3s cBptLzmxYvEri0FAOGx44aKH+1fm7XIJisDkFk06VaUZ3mvQhupcSzG3Xuuf4vGE5x39 dxkwAX8H3IwL4z2GFnNP7qYuLgtib0oOX/tXOhCt+ArtB6BbHIlQNSYsK2hZfR/W+J6A kG9qBVlA6c2Iv3dtOmTJdEdJGT7Y3YUMzU1M9Sj0D+SyCKO4K8rV75JXqJ6gI/oArLcH EFLXJa5cSvP3xon0M/lupfLwRWym+XuFuxVtizzKjReVW7+1kg8JhSjQJTD+sjRLSYZd dkTA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=YHGDGltZfqlB3XTjp4uvBCSj0Z3EcQlnrdyUaIBNszg=; b=YzKGTJ8Peeo06LDSiIzQF9IBDmPvp5NIzQvs+UePVeVgu7QrR9vZdUELahXfe/Xq+W toudpzuZDgjXbZsvWj7HF3V+wK3CDHU61XtggBMyv1nmmuMaiVVPiHJEeXNyRdKR2J1N 9/V/yZfLu1oZoD7vn4EDRukK5hgIDmj/AC7lhszuLMRWFzzfC2A8c3qgScQGaKtQCeZl /KVwaM4sg+SumuvMlIFHyjgQ1eUUTUJ0ivVmjqykK3RFTpUO0qFHhwSWjCQVaKLQ9+lu bWc6R+/CErRA8S+zH3eX4CqPZic9IrCfnXAPqlXXqS+ln0obtNiL8Wcug5zUfsUDP38M Gqww== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=VUQtctVG; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n69si13851151pfb.256.2019.04.15.12.15.25; Mon, 15 Apr 2019 12:15:41 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=VUQtctVG; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731685AbfDOTOC (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:14:02 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52058 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731673AbfDOTOB (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Apr 2019 15:14:01 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1233E218A1; Mon, 15 Apr 2019 19:13:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1555355640; bh=e2tOFBoU5wYtkPRHkaxNc1B5wnVXy5OOuGbYz/kMnbU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=VUQtctVGFVCQweIzf1yveyWSe1CvtDQDW7cNX6LaCUp7Oi9cMWne64qy6Iyh0XrjP d/7DOx6U3DfR7UvmXcQxxAhtYvMRJy/Z446cvmGWYwd67OrxreNX93AsNJsTZ2uYBs NNjfUrgVajEGEhCyeu7a9uRfmqU2jFp8FxFrSISI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter , Boris Ostrovsky , Juergen Gross Subject: [PATCH 5.0 097/117] xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 21:01:07 +0200 Message-Id: <20190415183749.748211194@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190415183744.887851196@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190415183744.887851196@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Dan Carpenter commit 42d8644bd77dd2d747e004e367cb0c895a606f39 upstream. The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(). It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32) elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of bounds access. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call, __HYPERCALL_DECLS; __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); + if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0])) + return -EINVAL; + asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])