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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a192si31262035pge.50.2019.04.17.00.10.56; Wed, 17 Apr 2019 00:11:12 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731049AbfDQHIX convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 17 Apr 2019 03:08:23 -0400 Received: from relay4-d.mail.gandi.net ([217.70.183.196]:45777 "EHLO relay4-d.mail.gandi.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728261AbfDQHIX (ORCPT ); Wed, 17 Apr 2019 03:08:23 -0400 X-Originating-IP: 90.88.160.238 Received: from xps13 (aaubervilliers-681-1-42-238.w90-88.abo.wanadoo.fr [90.88.160.238]) (Authenticated sender: miquel.raynal@bootlin.com) by relay4-d.mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C2AD0E0014; Wed, 17 Apr 2019 07:08:18 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 09:08:17 +0200 From: Miquel Raynal To: masonccyang@mxic.com.tw Cc: "Boris Brezillon" , bbrezillon@kernel.org, computersforpeace@gmail.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, juliensu@mxic.com.tw, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, marek.vasut@gmail.com, richard@nod.at, zhengxunli@mxic.com.tw Subject: Re: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: Add Macronix NAND read retry and randomizer support Message-ID: <20190417090817.7a0c4638@xps13> In-Reply-To: References: <1554780172-23111-1-git-send-email-masonccyang@mxic.com.tw> <20190409090427.22de9917@collabora.com> <20190409114701.744c2c8c@collabora.com> <20190410092258.332ef399@collabora.com> <20190411085353.4c1af008@collabora.com> <20190411112943.1fecfa69@collabora.com> Organization: Bootlin X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.17.1 (GTK+ 2.24.32; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi Mason, masonccyang@mxic.com.tw wrote on Wed, 17 Apr 2019 10:46:57 +0800: > Hi Boris, > > > > > > > > > > Subject > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Re: [PATCH] mtd: rawnand: Add Macronix NAND read retry and > > > > > randomizer > > > > > > > support > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, 9 Apr 2019 17:35:39 +0800 > > > > > > > > masonccyang@mxic.com.tw wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > +static const struct kobj_attribute sysfs_mxic_nand = > > > > > > > > > > > + __ATTR(nand_random, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, > > > > > > > > > > > + mxic_nand_rand_type_show, > > > > > > > > > > > + mxic_nand_rand_type_store); > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > No, we don't want to expose that through a sysfs file, > > > > > especially > > > > > > > since > > > > > > > > > > changing the randomizer config means making the NAND > > > unreadable > > > > > for > > > > > > > > > > those that have used it before the change. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Our on-die randomizer is still readable from user after > the > > > > > function > > > > > > > > > is enabled. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You mean the memory is still readable no matter the > randomizer > > > > > state. > > > > > > > > Not sure how that's possible, but okay. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This randomizer is just like a internal memory cell > > > > > > > > > reliability enhanced. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why don't you enable it by default then? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The penalty of randomizer is read/write performance down. > > > > > > > i.e,. tPROG 300 us to 340 us (randomizer enable) > > > > > > > therefore, disable it by default. > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm a bit puzzled. On the NAND I've seen that required data > > > > > > randomization it's not something you'd want to disable as this > > > implied > > > > > > poor data retention. What's the use case here? Are we talking > about > > > SLC > > > > > > or MLC NANDs? Should we enable this feature once we start seeing > > > > that > > > > > > the NAND starts being less reliable (basically when read-retry > > > happens > > > > > > more often)? I really think this is something you should decide > > > > kernel > > > > > > side, because users have no clue when it's appropriate to switch > > > > this > > > > > > feature on/off. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It's SLC NAND and seems to has nothing to do with read-retry > happens. > > > > > later, I will get more information for your concerns. > > > > > > > > Well, this feature is optional, and can be enabled to improve > > > > reliability. Sounds like a good reason to enable it when your NAND > > > > device starts showing reliability issues, and the number of > read_retry > > > > attempts reflects the wear level pretty well. Alternatively, you > could > > > > use the number of bitflips, but, in any case, don't expect the user > to > > > > take this decision, because almost nobody knows what the randomizer > > > > is needed for. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It could be enable at any time with OTP bit function and > > > that's > > > > > why > > > > > > > > > we patch it by sys-fs. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sorry, but that's not a good reason to expose that through > > > sysfs. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Any good way to expose randomizer function for user ? > > > > > > > > > > > > Don't expose it :P. > > > > > > > > > > oh, okay, I will remove sys-fs randomizer. > > > > > > > > > > Is it OK to keep set/get features for randomizer ? > > > > > > > > I don't think it's a good idea to have dead code, so no. But I'm > pretty > > > > sure we'll find a way to use/expose this feature. > > > > > > okay, great! > > > Looking forward to hearing this feature use/expose. > > > > But for that to happen we are waiting for inputs about when this is > > supposed to be used... > > > The main reason to disable Randomizer in default is > NOP = 4 (default) change to NOP = 1 (Randomizer enable), > NOP: number of partial program cycles in same page I am not sure to understand, is this related to what we call 'subpages'? > > Some OS file systems(or FTL) much concern NOP = 4 and > any better way than sys-fs to enable it? sysfs entry => user action The user has absolutely no way to know when it is relevant to enable the randomizer. The kernel must be in charge of it. So the question is: when is it relevant to enable the randomizer? What criteria? What threshold? Thanks, Miquèl