Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Mon, 9 Apr 2001 02:25:16 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Mon, 9 Apr 2001 02:25:06 -0400 Received: from abraham.CS.Berkeley.EDU ([128.32.37.121]:19725 "EHLO paip.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Mon, 9 Apr 2001 02:24:52 -0400 To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Path: not-for-mail From: daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) Newsgroups: isaac.lists.linux-kernel Subject: Re: Sources of entropy - /dev/random problem for network servers Date: 9 Apr 2001 06:17:12 GMT Organization: University of California, Berkeley Lines: 26 Distribution: isaac Message-ID: <9ark58$133$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu> In-Reply-To: <1457842476.986773581@[195.224.237.69]> Reply-To: daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) NNTP-Posting-Host: mozart.cs.berkeley.edu X-Trace: abraham.cs.berkeley.edu 986797032 1123 128.32.45.153 (9 Apr 2001 06:17:12 GMT) X-Complaints-To: news@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu NNTP-Posting-Date: 9 Apr 2001 06:17:12 GMT X-Newsreader: trn 4.0-test74 (May 26, 2000) Originator: daw@mozart.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Alex Bligh - linux-kernel wrote: >In debugging why my (unloaded) IMAP server takes many seconds >to open folders, I discovered what looks like a problem >in 2.4's feeding of entropy into /dev/random. When there >is insufficient entropy in the random number generator, >reading from /dev/random blocks for several seconds. /dev/random >is used (correctly) for crytographic key verification. Use /dev/urandom, or buy a hardware RNG. >However, only 3 drivers in drivers/net actually set >SA_SAMPLE_RANDOM when calling request_irq(). I believe >all of them should. And indeed this fixed the problem for >me using an eepro100(). This is unsafe. The time that packets arrive is not secret: anyone who can run a sniffer on your network can potentially recover this information. Thus, such timings are unsuitable for introduction into the entropy pool. (More precisely, there's no harm in adding them to the entropy pool if they are added in a way so that the /dev/random pool doesn't increment its estimate of how much entropy it has collected. The real harm comes when you bump up the randomness counter based on them, and if I understand your proposed change, this is what it's doing.) - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/