Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S265840AbUFIQxW (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Jun 2004 12:53:22 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S265841AbUFIQxW (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Jun 2004 12:53:22 -0400 Received: from 34.mufa.noln.chcgil24.dsl.att.net ([12.100.181.34]:17653 "EHLO tabby.cats.internal") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S265840AbUFIQxT (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Jun 2004 12:53:19 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="CP 1252" From: Jesse Pollard To: "Robert White" , "'Ingo Molnar'" , "'Christoph Hellwig'" , "'Mike McCormack'" , Subject: Re: WINE + NX (No eXecute) support for x86, 2.6.7-rc2-bk2 Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2004 11:53:05 -0500 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.2] References: In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <04060911530500.08612@tabby> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 834 Lines: 19 On Tuesday 08 June 2004 16:50, Robert White wrote: > I would think that having an easy call to disable the NX modification would > be both safe and effective. That is, adding a syscall (or whatever) that > would let you mark your heap and/or stack executable while leaving the new > default as NX, is "just as safe" as flagging the executable in the first > place. ahhhh no. The first attack against a vulerable server would be to load a string on the stack that would: 1. have address of the syscall to turn off NX, then return to the stack. 2. have normal worm/virus code following. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/