Subject: Re: In-kernel Authentication Tokens (PAGs)
From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
To: Blair Strang <bls@asterisk.co.nz>
Cc: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@mac.com>, lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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P? ty , 15/06/2004 klokka 02:38, skreiv Blair Strang:

> Surely the only logical reason to tag a process with extra security
> information /in the kernel/ is because that information is going to be
> used /by the kernel/.  I can't think of a good reason to put a
> generalised keystore in the kernel.

Here are three good reasons.

 - You want the key lifetime to be the same as your process lifetime
 - You want the key to be readable ONLY by that one process.
 - The kernel wants to supports multiple security realms and mechanisms.
Not everybody is happy with just kerberosV credentials, and we already
have beta code for the SPKM mechanism in RPCSEC_GSS.


As for the AFS PAG idea: it's already been shot down. See the
linux-fsdevel thread I referred to earlier.

Cheers,
  Trond
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