Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S266200AbUIIVUV (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Sep 2004 17:20:21 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S267625AbUIIVUG (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Sep 2004 17:20:06 -0400 Received: from fw.osdl.org ([65.172.181.6]:24795 "EHLO mail.osdl.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S266200AbUIIVFg (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Sep 2004 17:05:36 -0400 Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2004 14:05:11 -0700 From: Chris Wright To: Stephen Smalley , William Lee Irwin III , Andrew Morton , lkml , Albert Cahalan , "Martin J. Bligh" , Paul Jackson , James Morris , Chris Wright Subject: Re: [1/1][PATCH] nproc v2: netlink access to /proc information Message-ID: <20040909140511.D1924@build.pdx.osdl.net> References: <20040908184130.GA12691@k3.hellgate.ch> <1094730811.22014.8.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20040909172200.GX3106@holomorphy.com> <20040909175342.GA27518@k3.hellgate.ch> <1094760065.22014.328.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20040909205531.GA17088@k3.hellgate.ch> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <20040909205531.GA17088@k3.hellgate.ch>; from rl@hellgate.ch on Thu, Sep 09, 2004 at 10:55:31PM +0200 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1651 Lines: 41 * Roger Luethi (rl@hellgate.ch) wrote: > On Thu, 09 Sep 2004 16:01:06 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > For the same reason, I'm not comfortable with implementing SELinux type > > > access controls myself. How about: > > > > > > config NPROC > > > depends on !SECURITY_SELINUX > > > > > > Adding access control later won't be a problem for anyone who groks > > > SELinux. > > > [...] > > Most obvious place to hook would be nproc_ps_get_task; we could then > > perform a check based on the sender's credentials and the target task's > > credentials, and simply return NULL if permission is not granted for > > that pair, thus skipping that task as if it didn't exist. That requires > > propagating the sender's credentials down to that function. > > > > Untested patch below. > > I used a somewhat different approach in my development tree (not > SELinuxy, though): Most fields were world readable, some required > credentials. > > I don't have any strong feelings on access control, so I'd be happy > with any mechanism that doesn't completely botch performance. Anyway, > I do not consider lack of access controls to be a showstopper. Some of these things become quite sensitive, esp across setuid, etc. For prototyping, I agree, not a showstopper. For merging, it should be figured out properly. thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/