Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S269208AbUJMP3r (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2004 11:29:47 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S269190AbUJMP3r (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2004 11:29:47 -0400 Received: from facesaver.epoch.ncsc.mil ([144.51.25.10]:33021 "EHLO epoch.ncsc.mil") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S269102AbUJMP3d (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2004 11:29:33 -0400 Subject: Re: [patch 2/3] lsm: add bsdjail module From: Stephen Smalley To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Ulrich Drepper , lkml In-Reply-To: <20041013012206.GA368@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> References: <1097094103.6939.5.camel@serge.austin.ibm.com> <1097094270.6939.9.camel@serge.austin.ibm.com> <20041006162620.4c378320.akpm@osdl.org> <20041007190157.GA3892@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> <20041010104113.GC28456@infradead.org> <1097502444.31259.19.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20041012131124.GA2484@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> <416C5C26.9020403@redhat.com> <20041013005856.GA3364@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> <416C8048.1000602@redhat.com> <20041013012206.GA368@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain Organization: National Security Agency Message-Id: <1097681181.32468.291.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.4.6 (1.4.6-2) Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2004 11:26:21 -0400 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1176 Lines: 25 On Tue, 2004-10-12 at 21:22, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Then they would have to check for an optional "selinux: " at the front > of each security_setprocattr entry read in the kernel, in order to handle > an lsm infrastructure change which might never be accepted into the kernel > anyway. I suppose it's pretty trivial anyway, but then why would they > bother... The changes to libselinux and procps and any scripts that directly access /proc/pid/attr to deal with multi-entry values would be more important; changing the kernel to prepend "selinux: " on getprocattr and to strip it on setprocattr would indeed be trivial (but one wonders whether we can be confident that userspace will never try to pass one of these multi-entry values read from /proc/pid/attr to another interface that expects a single context, e.g. selinuxfs or setxattr("security.selinux")). -- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/