Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S269320AbUJQUTD (ORCPT ); Sun, 17 Oct 2004 16:19:03 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S269324AbUJQUTB (ORCPT ); Sun, 17 Oct 2004 16:19:01 -0400 Received: from sccrmhc12.comcast.net ([204.127.202.56]:15014 "EHLO sccrmhc12.comcast.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S269394AbUJQUS3 (ORCPT ); Sun, 17 Oct 2004 16:18:29 -0400 Subject: Re: [patch] exec-shield-nx-2.6.9-A1 From: Albert Cahalan To: linux-kernel mailing list Cc: mingo@elte.hu Content-Type: text/plain Organization: Message-Id: <1098043886.2674.14320.camel@cube> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.2.4 Date: 17 Oct 2004 16:11:27 -0400 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 964 Lines: 26 You have some bits in this patch that don't belong. They aren't even conditional on a config option or sysctl value. First, you change the permission on the /proc/*/maps file. Normally a remote attacker is unable to read this anyway, and a local setuid attack has time to try until success. Changing the permission might be a good idea, mostly because it exposes filenames, but it should be a separate patch. Second, you restrict wchan. Oddly, you don't allow for the target task's euid to play a role, and you chose the CAP_SYS_NICE bit instead of some other bit. Huh? One might guess from CAP_SYS_NICE that the feature has now become hopelessly slow. Same as with the maps file, this should be a separate patch. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/