Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262291AbUK3TdI (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Nov 2004 14:33:08 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262284AbUK3TbC (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Nov 2004 14:31:02 -0500 Received: from fw.osdl.org ([65.172.181.6]:33988 "EHLO mail.osdl.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262282AbUK3T3a (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Nov 2004 14:29:30 -0500 Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2004 11:29:03 -0800 From: Chris Wright To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Andrew Morton , lkml , Jeff Mahoney , James Morris , Chris Wright Subject: Re: 2.6.10-rc2-mm4 Message-ID: <20041130112903.C2357@build.pdx.osdl.net> References: <20041130095045.090de5ea.akpm@osdl.org> <1101842310.4401.111.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <1101842310.4401.111.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>; from sds@epoch.ncsc.mil on Tue, Nov 30, 2004 at 02:18:30PM -0500 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1864 Lines: 36 * Stephen Smalley (sds@epoch.ncsc.mil) wrote: > On Tue, 2004-11-30 at 12:50, Andrew Morton wrote: > > http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.10-rc2/2.6.10-rc2-mm4/ > > > selinux-adds-a-private-inode-operation.patch > > selinux: adds a private inode operation > > Below is a re-base to 2.6.10-rc2-mm4 of a patch I posted earlier during > the original discussion of the above referenced patch. This patch > removes the unnecessary code in inode_doinit_with_dentry, replaces the > unused inherits flag field (legacy from earlier code) with a private > flag field, does not set the SID in selinux_inode_mark_private (leaving > it with the unlabeled SID, which will ensure that we notice it if it > ever reaches a SELinux permission check), and modifies SELinux > permission checking functions and post_create() to test for the private > flag and skip SELinux processing in that case. Please include if/when > the reiserfs/selinux patchset goes upstream. I know that Chris Wright > had raised the question of whether we should be using i_flags to convey > the "private" nature of the inode rather than using a security hook, but > didn't see any resolution of that issue. My concerns are that the check has to be duplicated in any module, and that thus far we've tried to keep out fs -> module communication, letting vfs do it. This could at least be fs -> vfs communication, and then either vfs or security framework could check flags and never call into module on fs private objects. thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/