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References: <1104979908.8060.34.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20050105212629.K469@build.pdx.osdl.net> <1105023040.4028.36.camel@localhost.localdomain>
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Cc: narahimi@us.ibm.com, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@wirex.com
From: Felipe Alfaro Solana <lkml@mac.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Enhanced Trusted Path Execution (TPE) Linux Security	Module
Date: Thu, 6 Jan 2005 19:00:56 +0100
To: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Lorenzo_Hern=E1ndez_Garc=EDa-Hierro?= 
	<lorenzo@gnu.org>
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On 6 Jan 2005, at 15:50, Lorenzo Hern?ndez Garc?a-Hierro wrote:

>> The two biggest issues are 1) it's trivial to bypass:
>> $ /lib/ld.so /untrusted/path/to/program
>> and 2) that there's no (visible/vocal) user base calling for the 
>> feature.
>
> About the point 1), yesterday i wrote just a simple regression test
> (that can be found at the same place as the patch) and of course it
> bypasses, this is an old commented problem, Stephen suggested the use 
> of
> the mmap and mprotect hooks, so, i will have a look at them but i'm not
> sure on how to (really) prevent the dirty,old trick.
> About 2), just give it a chance, maybe it's useful and my work is not
> completely nonsense.

Well, I'm not a visible/vocal user base, but I do really like this TPE 
LSM module.
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