Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262568AbVAPS7r (ORCPT ); Sun, 16 Jan 2005 13:59:47 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262571AbVAPS7r (ORCPT ); Sun, 16 Jan 2005 13:59:47 -0500 Received: from tomts13.bellnexxia.net ([209.226.175.34]:14486 "EHLO tomts13-srv.bellnexxia.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262568AbVAPS7p (ORCPT ); Sun, 16 Jan 2005 13:59:45 -0500 To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Process system call access list. From: Bill Pringlemeir Date: 16 Jan 2005 14:00:22 -0500 Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.09 (Gnus v5.9.0) Emacs/21.3 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1631 Lines: 35 [please CC me.] I was looking at phrack and many of the remote exploits rely on injecting some arbitrary code. Generally is is something like 'exec("/bin/sh")' or something like that. I was wondering if a section could be added to the link phase of a user application that would keep a list/bit mask of all kernel calls that the compiler had encountered in some section. When the kernel loaded a process, it would keep a copy of the bit mask and perform a comparison to see if the process was intended to make the system call (perhaps only a sub-set of the entire system calls are needed). Of course, I imagine there is some reason that a process would like to dynamically create it's own code [although it wouldn't be the majority?], so the bit mask could be set to all ones via some linker magic when building the user application. Generally it would help protect against remote code injection and some possible privilege elevation exploits by restricting system calls. On the down side, it is probably not fool proof and might give people a false sense of security. So perhaps it is not a good feature for the kernel to have. Sorry if this has been discussed before. Unlike disk encryption, I couldn't find a reference to this topic, but maybe my search was using the wrong nomenclature. The susinct question would be is this worth implementing? tia, Bill Pringlemeir. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/