Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix audit control message checks
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <hallyn@cs.wm.edu>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
       James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
In-Reply-To: <20050115200734.GA22087@escher.cs.wm.edu>
References: <20050115200734.GA22087@escher.cs.wm.edu>
Content-Type: text/plain
Organization: National Security Agency
Message-Id: <1106055058.18274.57.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2005 08:30:58 -0500
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Content-Length: 1378
Lines: 38

On Sat, 2005-01-15 at 15:07, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> The audit control messages are sent over netlink.  Permission checks
> are done on the process receiving the message, which may not be the
> same as the process sending the message.  This patch switches the
> netlink_send security hooks to calculate the effective capabilities
> based on the sender.  Then audit_receive_msg performs capability checks
> based on that.
> 
> It also introduces the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE and CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL capabilities,
> and replaces the previous CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in audit code with the
> appropriate checks.
> 
> Please apply.
> 
> Changelog:
> 	1/15/2005: Simplified dummy_netlink_send given that dummy now
> 		keeps track of capabilities.
> 	1/14/2005: Many fixes based on feedback from linux-audit@redhat.com
> 		list.
> 	1/14/2005: Removed the netlink_msg_type helper function.
> 	1/07/2005: Swith to using CAP_AUDIT_WRITE and CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
> 
> thanks,
> -serge
> 
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/