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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 32si9058753pld.155.2019.04.20.18.31.44; Sat, 20 Apr 2019 18:32:40 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728069AbfDUB26 (ORCPT + 99 others); Sat, 20 Apr 2019 21:28:58 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:3763 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727627AbfDUB2t (ORCPT ); Sat, 20 Apr 2019 21:28:49 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Apr 2019 18:28:47 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,376,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="136008189" Received: from allen-box.sh.intel.com ([10.239.159.136]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 20 Apr 2019 18:24:07 -0700 From: Lu Baolu To: David Woodhouse , Joerg Roedel Cc: ashok.raj@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@intel.com, alan.cox@intel.com, kevin.tian@intel.com, mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com, pengfei.xu@intel.com, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Christoph Hellwig , Marek Szyprowski , Robin Murphy , iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Lu Baolu , Jacob Pan Subject: [PATCH v3 08/10] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer Date: Sun, 21 Apr 2019 09:17:17 +0800 Message-Id: <20190421011719.14909-9-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190421011719.14909-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> References: <20190421011719.14909-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This adds a helper to check whether a device needs to use bounce buffer. It also provides a boot time option to disable the bounce buffer. Users can use this to prevent the iommu driver from using the bounce buffer for performance gain. Cc: Ashok Raj Cc: Jacob Pan Cc: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Tested-by: Xu Pengfei Tested-by: Mika Westerberg --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +++++ drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 2b8ee90bb644..86880eb3fc73 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1726,6 +1726,11 @@ Note that using this option lowers the security provided by tboot because it makes the system vulnerable to DMA attacks. + nobounce [Default off] + Do not use the bounce buffer for untrusted devices like + the Thunderbolt devices. This will treat the untrusted + devices as the trusted ones, hence might expose security + risks of DMA attacks. intel_idle.max_cstate= [KNL,HW,ACPI,X86] 0 disables intel_idle and fall back on acpi_idle. diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c index e4a164324bdd..0d80f26b8a72 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_strict; static int intel_iommu_superpage = 1; static int intel_iommu_sm; static int iommu_identity_mapping; +static int intel_no_bounce; #define IDENTMAP_ALL 1 #define IDENTMAP_GFX 2 @@ -396,6 +397,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_iommu_gfx_mapped); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(device_domain_lock); static LIST_HEAD(device_domain_list); +static inline bool device_needs_bounce(struct device *dev) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = NULL; + + if (intel_no_bounce) + return false; + + if (dev_is_pci(dev)) + pdev = to_pci_dev(dev); + + return pdev ? pdev->untrusted : false; +} + /* * Iterate over elements in device_domain_list and call the specified * callback @fn against each element. @@ -478,6 +492,9 @@ static int __init intel_iommu_setup(char *str) printk(KERN_INFO "Intel-IOMMU: not forcing on after tboot. This could expose security risk for tboot\n"); intel_iommu_tboot_noforce = 1; + } else if (!strncmp(str, "nobounce", 8)) { + pr_info("Intel-IOMMU: No bounce buffer. This could expose security risks of DMA attacks\n"); + intel_no_bounce = 1; } str += strcspn(str, ","); -- 2.17.1