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Date:   Mon, 22 Apr 2019 09:48:27 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "nhorman@redhat.com" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
        "npmccallum@redhat.com" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
        "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
Message-ID: <20190422164827.GC1236@linux.intel.com>
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 <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904192337160.3174@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
 <5854e66a-950e-1b12-5393-d9cdd15367dc@fortanix.com>
 <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904200727410.3174@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
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On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 11:24:11AM -0500, Dr. Greg wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 08:01:19AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> 
> Good morning to everyone, I hope the week is starting well.
> 
> > On Sat, Apr 20, 2019 at 11:02:47AM -0500, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > > We understand and support the need for the LSM to trap these
> > > events, but what does LSM provenance mean if the platform is
> > > compromised?  That is, technically, the target application for SGX
> > > technology.
> 
> > No, it's not.  Protecting the kernel/platform from a malicious
> > entity is outside the scope of SGX.
> 
> You must have misinterpreted my statement, providing security
> guarantees in the face of a compromised platform is exactly what SGX
> was designed to do and is how Intel is marketing the technology.

Right, and loading a malicious enclave doesn't change those guarantees
(for other enclaves).  Ergo, restricting which enclaves can execute is
orthogonal to the security provided by SGX.