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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id z143si14700049pfc.64.2019.04.22.12.02.30; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 12:02:47 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728694AbfDVTAg (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 22 Apr 2019 15:00:36 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:60350 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728708AbfDVS6p (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Apr 2019 14:58:45 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Apr 2019 11:58:43 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,382,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="136417137" Received: from linksys13920.jf.intel.com (HELO rpedgeco-DESK5.jf.intel.com) ([10.54.75.11]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 22 Apr 2019 11:58:41 -0700 From: Rick Edgecombe To: Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Ingo Molnar Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner , Nadav Amit , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, Nadav Amit , Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Masami Hiramatsu , Rick Edgecombe Subject: [PATCH v4 07/23] x86/alternative: Use temporary mm for text poking Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 11:57:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20190422185805.1169-8-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190422185805.1169-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20190422185805.1169-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Nadav Amit text_poke() can potentially compromise security as it sets temporary PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the ability to write onto kernel memory. Moreover, since remote TLBs are not flushed after the temporary PTEs are removed, the time-window in which the code is writable is not limited if the fixmap PTEs - maliciously or accidentally - are cached in the TLB. To address these potential security hazards, use a temporary mm for patching the code. Finally, text_poke() is also not conservative enough when mapping pages, as it always tries to map 2 pages, even when a single one is sufficient. So try to be more conservative, and do not map more than needed. Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe --- arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 2 - arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 - 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h index 50ba74a34a37..9da8cccdf3fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h @@ -103,8 +103,6 @@ enum fixed_addresses { #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, #endif - FIX_TEXT_POKE1, /* reserve 2 pages for text_poke() */ - FIX_TEXT_POKE0, /* first page is last, because allocation is backward */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID FIX_LNW_VRTC, #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c index 11d5c710a94f..599203876c32 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -684,41 +685,104 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr; static void *__text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len) { + bool cross_page_boundary = offset_in_page(addr) + len > PAGE_SIZE; + struct page *pages[2] = {NULL}; + temp_mm_state_t prev; unsigned long flags; - char *vaddr; - struct page *pages[2]; - int i; + pte_t pte, *ptep; + spinlock_t *ptl; + pgprot_t pgprot; /* - * While boot memory allocator is runnig we cannot use struct - * pages as they are not yet initialized. + * While boot memory allocator is running we cannot use struct pages as + * they are not yet initialized. There is no way to recover. */ BUG_ON(!after_bootmem); if (!core_kernel_text((unsigned long)addr)) { pages[0] = vmalloc_to_page(addr); - pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); + if (cross_page_boundary) + pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); } else { pages[0] = virt_to_page(addr); WARN_ON(!PageReserved(pages[0])); - pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); + if (cross_page_boundary) + pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); } - BUG_ON(!pages[0]); + /* + * If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not + * implemented. + */ + BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1])); + local_irq_save(flags); - set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0, page_to_phys(pages[0])); - if (pages[1]) - set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1, page_to_phys(pages[1])); - vaddr = (char *)fix_to_virt(FIX_TEXT_POKE0); - memcpy(&vaddr[(unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK], opcode, len); - clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0); - if (pages[1]) - clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1); - local_flush_tlb(); - sync_core(); - /* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but - that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */ - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) - BUG_ON(((char *)addr)[i] != ((char *)opcode)[i]); + + /* + * Map the page without the global bit, as TLB flushing is done with + * flush_tlb_mm_range(), which is intended for non-global PTEs. + */ + pgprot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL); + + /* + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding. + */ + ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, &ptl); + + /* + * This must not fail; preallocated in poking_init(). + */ + VM_BUG_ON(!ptep); + + pte = mk_pte(pages[0], pgprot); + set_pte_at(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep, pte); + + if (cross_page_boundary) { + pte = mk_pte(pages[1], pgprot); + set_pte_at(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1, pte); + } + + /* + * Loading the temporary mm behaves as a compiler barrier, which + * guarantees that the PTE will be set at the time memcpy() is done. + */ + prev = use_temporary_mm(poking_mm); + + kasan_disable_current(); + memcpy((u8 *)poking_addr + offset_in_page(addr), opcode, len); + kasan_enable_current(); + + /* + * Ensure that the PTE is only cleared after the instructions of memcpy + * were issued by using a compiler barrier. + */ + barrier(); + + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep); + if (cross_page_boundary) + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep + 1); + + /* + * Loading the previous page-table hierarchy requires a serializing + * instruction that already allows the core to see the updated version. + * Xen-PV is assumed to serialize execution in a similar manner. + */ + unuse_temporary_mm(prev); + + /* + * Flushing the TLB might involve IPIs, which would require enabled + * IRQs, but not if the mm is not used, as it is in this point. + */ + flush_tlb_mm_range(poking_mm, poking_addr, poking_addr + + (cross_page_boundary ? 2 : 1) * PAGE_SIZE, + PAGE_SHIFT, false); + + /* + * If the text does not match what we just wrote then something is + * fundamentally screwy; there's nothing we can really do about that. + */ + BUG_ON(memcmp(addr, opcode, len)); + + pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); local_irq_restore(flags); return addr; } diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c index a21e1734fc1f..beb44e22afdf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c @@ -2318,8 +2318,6 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION) case VSYSCALL_PAGE: #endif - case FIX_TEXT_POKE0: - case FIX_TEXT_POKE1: /* All local page mappings */ pte = pfn_pte(phys, prot); break; -- 2.17.1