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Miller" Subject: [PATCH 4.4 084/168] netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix() Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 19:08:48 +0200 Message-Id: <20190424170928.781084159@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190424170923.452349382@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190424170923.452349382@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Dumazet [ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ] net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net, and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is not dynamically allocated) I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending too many cycles in this function, but security comes first. Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS. Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Amit Klein Reported-by: Benny Pinkas Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/net_namespace.h | 1 + include/net/netns/hash.h | 15 ++------------- net/core/net_namespace.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/include/net/net_namespace.h +++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct net { */ spinlock_t rules_mod_lock; + u32 hash_mix; atomic64_t cookie_gen; struct list_head list; /* list of network namespaces */ --- a/include/net/netns/hash.h +++ b/include/net/netns/hash.h @@ -1,21 +1,10 @@ #ifndef __NET_NS_HASH_H__ #define __NET_NS_HASH_H__ -#include - -struct net; +#include static inline u32 net_hash_mix(const struct net *net) { -#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS - /* - * shift this right to eliminate bits, that are - * always zeroed - */ - - return (u32)(((unsigned long)net) >> L1_CACHE_SHIFT); -#else - return 0; -#endif + return net->hash_mix; } #endif --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ static __net_init int setup_net(struct n atomic_set(&net->count, 1); atomic_set(&net->passive, 1); + get_random_bytes(&net->hash_mix, sizeof(u32)); net->dev_base_seq = 1; net->user_ns = user_ns; idr_init(&net->netns_ids);