Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 138/168] net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
Date:   Wed, 24 Apr 2019 19:09:42 +0200
Message-Id: <20190424170931.435240086@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20190424170923.452349382@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20190424170923.452349382@linuxfoundation.org>
User-Agent: quilt/0.66
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

[ Upstream commit 899537b73557aafbdd11050b501cf54b4f5c45af ]

arg is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/atm/lec.c:715 lec_mcast_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing arg before using it to index dev_lec.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/atm/lec.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/atm/lec.c
+++ b/net/atm/lec.c
@@ -721,7 +721,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc
 
 static int lec_mcast_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, int arg)
 {
-	if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF || !dev_lec[arg])
+	if (arg < 0 || arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	arg = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
+	if (!dev_lec[arg])
 		return -EINVAL;
 	vcc->proto_data = dev_lec[arg];
 	return lec_mcast_make(netdev_priv(dev_lec[arg]), vcc);
@@ -739,6 +742,7 @@ static int lecd_attach(struct atm_vcc *v
 		i = arg;
 	if (arg >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	i = array_index_nospec(arg, MAX_LEC_ITF);
 	if (!dev_lec[i]) {
 		int size;