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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id e3si18887113pgs.37.2019.04.24.16.16.18; Wed, 24 Apr 2019 16:16:33 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=e3adDDAF; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2389988AbfDXRZO (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 24 Apr 2019 13:25:14 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51008 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730580AbfDXRZJ (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Apr 2019 13:25:09 -0400 Received: from localhost (62-193-50-229.as16211.net [62.193.50.229]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 13D6D206BA; Wed, 24 Apr 2019 17:25:08 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1556126708; bh=RESRptzGYH+h9x5zOZUnje4y/yt7XLk8hl2mjb+HMVs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=e3adDDAF8YyAV+yGqZJNqWAlXLXtUj8vb7fDa+Im6bN12mA5l9qGx82990ld1f9m0 Ezo74vrsJ58hxppajl8yEpknATeRyxFc+98lhbez7ZadpkWMe+owQOZk+VJrcBcwzE 3J3FLQnKSjyv8RchdJUUXm3/A78GOGQEtqzv26L4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrea Righi , Masami Hiramatsu , Steven Rostedt , Linus Torvalds , Mathieu Desnoyers , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar Subject: [PATCH 4.9 32/44] x86/kprobes: Verify stack frame on kretprobe Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2019 19:10:10 +0200 Message-Id: <20190424170859.202677397@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190424170839.924291114@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190424170839.924291114@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Masami Hiramatsu commit 3ff9c075cc767b3060bdac12da72fc94dd7da1b8 upstream. Verify the stack frame pointer on kretprobe trampoline handler, If the stack frame pointer does not match, it skips the wrong entry and tries to find correct one. This can happen if user puts the kretprobe on the function which can be used in the path of ftrace user-function call. Such functions should not be probed, so this adds a warning message that reports which function should be blacklisted. Tested-by: Andrea Righi Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu Acked-by: Steven Rostedt Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155094059185.6137.15527904013362842072.stgit@devbox Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/kprobes.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ void arch_prepare_kretprobe(struct kretp unsigned long *sara = stack_addr(regs); ri->ret_addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) *sara; + ri->fp = sara; /* Replace the return addr with trampoline addr */ *sara = (unsigned long) &kretprobe_trampoline; @@ -746,15 +747,21 @@ __visible __used void *trampoline_handle unsigned long flags, orig_ret_address = 0; unsigned long trampoline_address = (unsigned long)&kretprobe_trampoline; kprobe_opcode_t *correct_ret_addr = NULL; + void *frame_pointer; + bool skipped = false; INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&empty_rp); kretprobe_hash_lock(current, &head, &flags); /* fixup registers */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 regs->cs = __KERNEL_CS; + /* On x86-64, we use pt_regs->sp for return address holder. */ + frame_pointer = ®s->sp; #else regs->cs = __KERNEL_CS | get_kernel_rpl(); regs->gs = 0; + /* On x86-32, we use pt_regs->flags for return address holder. */ + frame_pointer = ®s->flags; #endif regs->ip = trampoline_address; regs->orig_ax = ~0UL; @@ -776,8 +783,25 @@ __visible __used void *trampoline_handle if (ri->task != current) /* another task is sharing our hash bucket */ continue; + /* + * Return probes must be pushed on this hash list correct + * order (same as return order) so that it can be poped + * correctly. However, if we find it is pushed it incorrect + * order, this means we find a function which should not be + * probed, because the wrong order entry is pushed on the + * path of processing other kretprobe itself. + */ + if (ri->fp != frame_pointer) { + if (!skipped) + pr_warn("kretprobe is stacked incorrectly. Trying to fixup.\n"); + skipped = true; + continue; + } orig_ret_address = (unsigned long)ri->ret_addr; + if (skipped) + pr_warn("%ps must be blacklisted because of incorrect kretprobe order\n", + ri->rp->kp.addr); if (orig_ret_address != trampoline_address) /* @@ -795,6 +819,8 @@ __visible __used void *trampoline_handle if (ri->task != current) /* another task is sharing our hash bucket */ continue; + if (ri->fp != frame_pointer) + continue; orig_ret_address = (unsigned long)ri->ret_addr; if (ri->rp && ri->rp->handler) { --- a/include/linux/kprobes.h +++ b/include/linux/kprobes.h @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct kretprobe_instance { struct kretprobe *rp; kprobe_opcode_t *ret_addr; struct task_struct *task; + void *fp; char data[0]; };