Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262726AbVBCAEw (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 Feb 2005 19:04:52 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262488AbVBBXwC (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 Feb 2005 18:52:02 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([66.187.233.31]:16821 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262683AbVBBXuU (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 Feb 2005 18:50:20 -0500 Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 23:50:02 +0000 From: Alasdair G Kergon To: Matt Mackall Cc: linux-kernel , Christophe Saout , Clemens Fruhwirth , dm-crypt@saout.de Subject: Re: dm-crypt crypt_status reports key? Message-ID: <20050202235002.GD14097@agk.surrey.redhat.com> Mail-Followup-To: Matt Mackall , linux-kernel , Christophe Saout , Clemens Fruhwirth , dm-crypt@saout.de References: <20050202211916.GJ2493@waste.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20050202211916.GJ2493@waste.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1690 Lines: 44 On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 01:19:16PM -0800, Matt Mackall wrote: > # dmsetup table /dev/mapper/volume1 > 0 2000000 crypt aes-plain 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef 0 7:0 0 > Obviously, root can in principle recover this password from the > running kernel but it seems silly to make it so easy. There seemed little point obfuscating it - someone will only write a trivial utility that recovers it. The current approach has the advantage of making it obvious to you that if you have root access, you have access to the password while the encrypted data volumes are mounted. Consider instead *why* you're worried about the password being held in RAM and look for better solutions to *your* perceived threats. Threat: Someone could run "dmsetup" while I've gone for a coffee break leaving my laptop unattended logged on as root... Threat: My laptop is stolen while it's got a screen saver running (or suspended) and the thief could interrogate RAM and get the password, giving them access to my encrypted data volumes. Possible fixes: Automatically unmount those volumes before starting the screen saver. Automatically unmount them after a certain amount of inactivity. Require the password to be re-entered at regular intervals. New risks: regular entry of password means more chance of its being observed, so consider one-time passwords to gain access to it, or USB dongle periodically inserted etc. etc. Alasdair -- agk@redhat.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/