Subject: Re: [PATCH][SELINUX] Fix selinux_inode_setattr hook
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
       lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
In-Reply-To: <20050204101440.N24171@build.pdx.osdl.net>
References: <1107539956.8078.109.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
	 <20050204101440.N24171@build.pdx.osdl.net>
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Organization: National Security Agency
Message-Id: <1107540806.8078.114.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
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Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2005 13:13:26 -0500
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On Fri, 2005-02-04 at 13:14, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov) wrote:
> > This patch against 2.6.11-rc3 fixes the selinux_inode_setattr hook
> > function to honor the ATTR_FORCE flag, skipping any permission checking
> > in that case.  Otherwise, it is possible though unlikely for a denial
> > from the hook to prevent proper updating, e.g. for remove_suid upon
> > writing to a file.  This would only occur if the process had write
> > permission to a suid file but lacked setattr permission to it.  Please
> > apply.
> 
> Is there any reason not to promote this to the framework?

I wasn't sure if a security module might still want to be notified of
forced changes (e.g. to adjust some state in its own security
structure), even if it skips permission checking on such changes.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency

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