Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2005 16:50:56 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Lorenzo Hern?ndez Garc?a-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
       "linux-security-module@wirex.com" <linux-security-module@wirex.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sys_chroot() hook for additional chroot() jails enforcing
Message-ID: <20050207225056.GA2388@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com>
References: <1107814610.3754.260.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <1107814610.3754.260.camel@localhost.localdomain>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Content-Length: 692
Lines: 18

Hi,

If I understood you correct earlier, the only policy you needed to
enforce was to prevent double-chrooting.  If that is the case, why is it
not sufficient to keep a "process-has-used-chroot" flag in
current->security which is set on the first call to
capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) and inherited by forked children, after which
calls to capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) are refused?

Of course if you need to do more, then a hook might be necessary.

-serge

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/