To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
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From: daw@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
Newsgroups: isaac.lists.linux-kernel
Subject: Re: [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8)
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2005 14:33:07 +0000 (UTC)
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Distribution: isaac
Message-ID: <cuaij3$63h$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>
References: <20050207192108.GA776@halcrow.us> <200502072241.j17MfTfP027969@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <cu95po$3ch$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu> <200502080210.j182Aioh007619@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Reply-To: daw-usenet@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
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Originator: daw@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
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>The attack is to hardlink some tempfile name to some file you want
>over-written.  This usually involves just a little bit of work, such as
>recognizing that a given root cronjob uses an unsafe predictable filename
>in /tmp (look at the Bugtraq or Full-Disclosure archives, there's plenty).
>Then you set a little program that sleep()s till a few seconds before
>the cronjob runs, does a getpid(), and then sprays hardlinks into the
>next 15 or 20 things that mktemp() will generate...

Got it.  Very good -- now I see.  Thanks for the explanation.
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