Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Thu, 12 Jul 2001 15:21:22 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Thu, 12 Jul 2001 15:21:12 -0400 Received: from deliverator.sgi.com ([204.94.214.10]:48458 "EHLO deliverator.sgi.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Thu, 12 Jul 2001 15:20:57 -0400 Message-ID: <3B4DF785.F0273621@sgi.com> Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2001 12:16:21 -0700 From: LA Walsh X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.77 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.4.6-pre3 i686) X-Accept-Language: en, en-US, en-GB, fr MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Greg KH CC: Anton Altaparmakov , Hans Reiser , reiserfs-dev@namesys.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, reiserfs-list@namesys.com Subject: Re: Security hooks, "standard linux security" & embedded use In-Reply-To: <3B49F602.DB39B3A@sgi.com> <3B4DDFD8.27C1C3D9@namesys.com> <5.1.0.14.2.20010712192608.0365e588@pop.cus.cam.ac.uk> <20010712114729.B735@kroah.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Greg KH wrote: > The current model lets you do whatever you want in your kernel module. > It imposes no policy, that's up to you. --- That's not exactly true. It imposes the standard Linux security policy which someone wanting to remove it or change it might not want. It only allows you to further restrict based on the current security system. > > All the better to keep userspace callbacks for security out of my > kernels, for that way is ripe for problems (for specific examples why, > see the linux-security-module mailing list archives.) --- I agree. Though an individual module writer could theoretically implement callbacks in their own module, no? -l -- - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - The above thoughts and | I know I don't know the opinions writings are my own. | of every part of my company. :-) - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/