Message-ID: <4242B712.50004@pobox.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2005 07:48:18 -0500
From: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>
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To: johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru
CC: David McCullough <davidm@snapgear.com>, cryptoapi@lists.logix.cz,
       linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
       Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
       Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy
 (2.6.11)
References: <20050315133644.GA25903@beast>  <20050324042708.GA2806@beast> <1111665551.23532.90.camel@uganda>
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Evgeniy Polyakov wrote:
> On Thu, 2005-03-24 at 14:27 +1000, David McCullough wrote:
> 
>>Hi all,
>>
>>Here is a small patch for 2.6.11 that adds a routine:
>>
>>	add_true_randomness(__u32 *buf, int nwords);
>>
>>so that true random number generator device drivers can add a entropy
>>to the system.  Drivers that use this can be found in the latest release
>>of ocf-linux,  an asynchronous crypto implementation for linux based on
>>the *BSD Cryptographic Framework.
>>
>>	http://ocf-linux.sourceforge.net/
>>
>>Adding this can dramatically improve the performance of /dev/random on
>>small embedded systems which do not generate much entropy.
> 
> 
> People will not apply any kind of such changes.
> Both OCF and acrypto already handle all RNG cases - no need for any kind
> of userspace daemon or entropy (re)injection mechanism.
> Anyone who want to use HW randomness may use OCF/acrypto mechanism.
> For example here is patch to enable acrypto support for hw_random.c
> It is very simple and support only upto 4 bytes request, of course it
> is 
> not interested for anyone, but it is only 2-minutes example:

If you want to add entropy to the kernel entropy pool from hardware RNG, 
you should use the userland daemon, which detects non-random (broken) 
hardware and provides throttling, so that RNG data collection does not 
consume 100% CPU.

If you want to use the hardware RNG directly, it's simple:  just open 
/dev/hw_random.

Hardware RNG should not go kernel->kernel without adding FIPS tests and 
such.

	Jeff


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