Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262606AbVEMWt2 (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 May 2005 18:49:28 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262575AbVEMWtQ (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 May 2005 18:49:16 -0400 Received: from clock-tower.bc.nu ([81.2.110.250]:46539 "EHLO lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262606AbVEMWtF (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 May 2005 18:49:05 -0400 Subject: Re: Hyper-Threading Vulnerability From: Alan Cox To: Matt Mackall Cc: Andy Isaacson , Andi Kleen , "Richard F. Rebel" , Gabor MICSKO , Linux Kernel Mailing List , tytso@mit.edu In-Reply-To: <20050513215905.GY5914@waste.org> References: <1115963481.1723.3.camel@alderaan.trey.hu> <1116009483.4689.803.camel@rebel.corp.whenu.com> <20050513190549.GB47131@muc.de> <20050513212620.GA12522@hexapodia.org> <20050513215905.GY5914@waste.org> Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <1116024419.20646.41.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.4.6 (1.4.6-2) Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 23:47:02 +0100 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 727 Lines: 15 On Gwe, 2005-05-13 at 22:59, Matt Mackall wrote: > It might not be much of a problem though. If he's a bit off per guess > (really impressive), he'll still be many bits off by the time there's > enough entropy in the primary pool to reseed the secondary pool so he > can check his guesswork. You can also disable the tsc to user space in the intel processors. Thats something they anticipated as being neccessary in secure environments long ago. This makes the attack much harder. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/