Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261481AbVE3QHq (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 May 2005 12:07:46 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261634AbVE3QHq (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 May 2005 12:07:46 -0400 Received: from parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk ([195.92.249.252]:10189 "EHLO parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261481AbVE3QHh (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 May 2005 12:07:37 -0400 Date: Mon, 30 May 2005 08:24:49 -0300 From: Marcelo Tosatti To: Willy Tarreau Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, julien@cr0.org Subject: Re: Linux-2.4.30-hf3 Message-ID: <20050530112449.GA5046@logos.cnet> References: <20050529223739.GA27341@exosec.fr> <20050530050746.GK18600@alpha.home.local> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20050530050746.GK18600@alpha.home.local> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.5.1i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1770 Lines: 50 On Mon, May 30, 2005 at 07:07:46AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote: > Hi again, > > Julien corrected me on the points below : > > > - a NULL dereference in serial.c found by Julien Tinnes which could lead > > to an oops. > > Could possibly be exploited by mapping the first page of a program and > watching the kernel eat the data instead of oopsing. Huh? I fail to see how that one is exploitable, given that no in-tree callers should pass "tty" as NULL to any of the affected functions (that is impossible, AFAICS). No? Julien? > > - an off-by-one in mtrr.c found by Brad Spengler and reported by J.Tinnes > > which could lead to a panic. > > This is inexact. I've checked several other archs : > - sparc, sparc64, x86_64, alpha, mips all assume that (n) is unsigned and > will overflow, possibly executing user-controlled code. > - ppc and ppc64 explicitly check that (n) is < TASK_SIZE and should be safe. You refer to copy_from_user() right? I suppose so, because there's no mtrr outside i386. > - x86 will BUG_ON((long)n < 0) (=> oops/panic). > - others not checked. Well, it requires root priveledges: + if (!len) return -EINVAL; if ( !suser () ) return -EPERM; <--------------- So, its "safe". > > - a few unchecked strcpy() in ipvs fixed in PaX which I'm not absolutely > > sure are exploitable, but are definitely dirty and risky. > > They are exploitable by anyone with enough privilege to manipulate IPVS. > Think of a user front-end for example. Ok. Great Willy! - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/