Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1030321AbVIOBS7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 14 Sep 2005 21:18:59 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1030322AbVIOBS7 (ORCPT ); Wed, 14 Sep 2005 21:18:59 -0400 Received: from zeniv.linux.org.uk ([195.92.253.2]:10709 "EHLO ZenIV.linux.org.uk") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1030321AbVIOBS6 (ORCPT ); Wed, 14 Sep 2005 21:18:58 -0400 Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2005 02:18:50 +0100 From: Al Viro To: Sripathi Kodi Cc: Linus Torvalds , Andrew Morton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patrics@interia.pl, Ingo Molnar , Roland McGrath Subject: Re: [PATCH 2.6.13.1] Patch for invisible threads Message-ID: <20050915011850.GZ25261@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <20050912134954.7bbd15b2.akpm@osdl.org> <4326CFE2.6000908@in.ibm.com> <20050913165102.GR25261@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20050913171215.GS25261@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <43274503.7090303@in.ibm.com> <20050914015003.GW25261@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <4328C0D0.6000909@in.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4328C0D0.6000909@in.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1608 Lines: 30 On Wed, Sep 14, 2005 at 07:31:12PM -0500, Sripathi Kodi wrote: > I can move this code from proc_root_link() to proc_check_root(), but it > will still not be completely limited to ->permission() path. I can create a > separate ->permission() for proc_task_inode_operations, and have this > additional code there. If I do that, I think I will have to duplicate much > of proc_check_root(). Or else, I will have to split proc_check_root() into > two functions to prevent code duplication. Please let me know if any of > these makes sense, and I will send another patch. The last variant would be preferable if we go in that direction... > If you don't like this idea at all, please let me know if there any other > way of solving the invisible threads problem, short of taking out > ->permission() altogether from proc_task_inode_operations. Frankly, I don't see the rationale for combination of * allowing anyone see all processes in top-level directory and visit their directories, chroot or not * allowing anyone see /proc//task/*, unless separated by chroot (note that we allow that regardless of process ownership, etc.) * disallowing to see /proc//task/* if leader is or used to be outside of our chroot. IOW, it's either too weak or too strong; current rules make very little sense, regardless of the behaviour when group leader dies. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/