Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750774AbVIPXyi (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Sep 2005 19:54:38 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750769AbVIPXyi (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Sep 2005 19:54:38 -0400 Received: from ams-iport-1.cisco.com ([144.254.224.140]:30650 "EHLO ams-iport-1.cisco.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750771AbVIPXyh (ORCPT ); Fri, 16 Sep 2005 19:54:37 -0400 To: Al Viro Cc: Linus Torvalds , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC] utterly bogus userland API in infinibad X-Message-Flag: Warning: May contain useful information References: <20050916181132.GF19626@ftp.linux.org.uk> <52fys4lsh9.fsf@cisco.com> <20050916203724.GH19626@ftp.linux.org.uk> From: Roland Dreier Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2005 16:54:31 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20050916203724.GH19626@ftp.linux.org.uk> (Al Viro's message of "Fri, 16 Sep 2005 21:37:24 +0100") Message-ID: <52psr8k1qg.fsf@cisco.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.1007 (Gnus v5.10.7) XEmacs/21.4.17 (Jumbo Shrimp, linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 X-OriginalArrivalTime: 16 Sep 2005 23:54:32.0518 (UTC) FILETIME=[FBEDF660:01C5BB19] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6670 Lines: 146 Al> Looks obvious enough. The very beginning of the function... Fair enough. Yes, there's an obvious reference leak there. Roland> Not sure I follow this. The intention is that those file Roland> descriptors be available to userspace for poll(), read(), Al> ... only in the opener process? And with insertion and Al> reporting done in separate syscalls? FWIW, we do have an Al> interface for passing a bunch of files into descriptor table - Al> SCM_RIGHTS datagrams. I have to confess I'm not familiar with how the kernel implements SCM_RIGHTS. Is it something we could use here? Al> is broken - anything that checks for ->ucontext and assumes Al> that non-NULL means a valid value is going to be screwed by Al> that. Use of local variable would at least deal with that; Al> however, you need exclusion and check to deal with multiple Al> calls of that sucker, parallel or not. Yes, good points. I'll fix that up. Al> First of all, this form of write() is no better than ioctl() - Al> you get exact same problems combined with lack of warning Al> (ioctl() is a warning enough - we all know that its arguments Al> can be interpreted in arbitrary ugly way; write() is not Al> generally assumed to suffer from that). Agreed -- as I said before, I don't think this is any better or worse than ioctl(). The reasons for choosing write() are mostly historial (write() at least didn't take the BKL). Now that we have unlocked_ioctl I have no objection to switching to ioctl(). Al> Note that quite a few of these guys are simply read() in Al> disguise, which is particulary strange since you _do_ have Al> extra file descriptors. Using write() to tell which stuff you Al> would like to read and where in userland should we put the Al> read value is... odd. Yes, it is a perversion of write() semantics. However I don't see a way to use read(), since there's no way to tell read() what data we want to get in a particular system call. For the "event files" we do use read() because the semantics are quite natural -- "give me the next event you have queued up." However, most of the operations on the main "command" file descriptor are more like transactions that take some inputs and return some outputs. For example, the "create queue pair" operation takes a bunch of inputs like "maximum number of queue entries" and returns a status, a queue pair number and a handle to the object that was created. Al> BTW Al> uobj = pd->uobject; Al> ret = ib_dealloc_pd(pd); Al> if (ret) Al> goto out; Al> idr_remove(&ib_uverbs_pd_idr, cmd.pd_handle); Al> spin_lock_irq(&file->ucontext->lock); Al> list_del(&uobj->list); Al> spin_unlock_irq(&file->ucontext->lock); Al> kfree(uobj); Al> looks funny - can anything else get to uobj via that list Al> here? If so, we are asking for trouble with that kfree()... I think that code is actually OK. The list is only used to keep track of objects that we need to clean up when the file is closed, and we'll only walk the list in the file's release method, when no one else can be using it. Al> but the points wrt interface are simple: Al> * you _did_ end up with a multiplexor; you've just got Al> it piggybacked on sys_write(). * part of that stuff appears Al> to be duplicating sysfs interfaces * a lot of that stuff looks Al> much more like a read(2), not write(2). * documentation Al> (however informal) of the list of things accessible via said Al> multiplexor is needed for further comments on the interface. Not sure exactly what documentation you're looking for. Let me know if the following is a good start, or if there's something else you want to know. The basic objects that we want userspace to be able to work with are: Context - resource container that everything else is inside. Corresponds to a file descriptor, and no one without access to the FD can mess with the context. Asynchronous event queue - queue of asynchronous events like "adapter port has changed state." We want this to be something userspace can poll(), sleep on, etc. Work completion event queue - similar to async event queue, but there are possibly multiple queues for a single context. Queues events like "completion notification has been added to completion queue." Similarly want to be able to poll(), sleep on individual queues, etc. Protection Domain (PD) - Another type of resource container. Every queue pair (QP) and memory region (MR) are attached to a PD. Userspace needs to be able to create and destroy PDs, and pass a handle to a PD when creating QPs and MRs. Memory Region (MR) - Area of memory that IB hardware is allowed direct access to. When created, L_Key and R_Key opaque cookies are returned. Userspace needs to be able to create and destroy MRs and have access to the L_Key and R_Key. Queue Pair (QP) - Pair of work queues (send queue and receive queue) that userspace can put work requests into for processing by IB hardware. Kernel is not involved in the fast path operations of adding work requests, but it must handle resource allocation when userspace creates a QP. Userspace also needs to be able to ask the kernel to modify and destroy QPs. The modify operation takes a bunch of parameters such as remote address to connect to, etc. Completion Queue (CQ) - Queue that holds information about completed work requests. Pretty similar to QPs: IB hardware writes into the queue and it's read directly from userspace with no kernel involvement, but the kernel has to handle resource allocation/cleanup. Also, userspace can request an interrupt when something is added to a CQ, and the kernel has to turn that interrupt into something userspace can read on the appropriate completion event queue. Every work queue is attached to a CQ, so we need to have handles we can pass into the create QP operation. There are a few other types of object like shared receive queues (SRQ) and memory windows (MW) but they're pretty similar to the main ones I described above. Thanks, Roland - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/