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From:   "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
To:     Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CC:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
        "ebiggers@google.com" <ebiggers@google.com>,
        "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
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        "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>,
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        "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
Thread-Topic: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon
 syscall
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Date:   Mon, 29 Apr 2019 07:49:36 +0000
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> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 11:33:09AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > Adding Eric and Herbert to continue discussion for the chacha part.
> > So, as a short summary I am trying to find out a fast (fast enough to be used per
> syscall
> > invocation) source of random bits with good enough security properties.
> > I started to look into chacha kernel implementation and while it seems that it is
> designed to
> > work with any number of rounds, it does not expose less than 12 rounds primitive.
> > I guess this is done for security sake, since 12 is probably the lowest bound we
> want people
> > to use for the purpose of encryption/decryption, but if we are to build an efficient
> RNG,
> > chacha8 probably is a good tradeoff between security and speed.
> >
> > What are people's opinions/perceptions on this? Has it been considered before to
> create a
> > kernel RNG based on chacha?
> 
> Well, sure.  The get_random_bytes() kernel interface and the
> getrandom(2) system call uses a CRNG based on chacha20.  See
> extract_crng() and crng_reseed() in drivers/char/random.c.

Oh, indeed, I missed this link fully when was trying to trace chacha
usages in kernel. I am not familiar with crypto kernel API and looks like
my source code cross referencing failed here miserably. 

Only question left is how fast/slow is this... 

Best Regards,
Elena.