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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 17si26147631pfw.148.2019.05.08.11.04.56; Wed, 08 May 2019 11:05:13 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727661AbfEHOrJ (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:47:09 -0400 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:33094 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728490AbfEHOow (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 May 2019 10:44:52 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 08 May 2019 07:44:51 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 Received: from black.fi.intel.com ([10.237.72.28]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 08 May 2019 07:44:45 -0700 Received: by black.fi.intel.com (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 269641075; Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:31 +0300 (EEST) From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" To: Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells Cc: Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:08 +0300 Message-Id: <20190508144422.13171-49-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Alison Schofield This is a draft for poweron testing. I'm assuming it needs to be in Intel-next to be available for poweron. It is not in the selftest Makefiles. COMPILE w keyutils library ==> cc -o mktest mktme_test.c -lkeyutils Usage: mktme_test [options]... -a Run ALL tests -t Run one test -l List available tests -h, -? Show this help mktest -l [ 1] Keys: Add each type key [ 2] Flow: One simple roundtrip [ 3] Keys: Valid Payload Options [ 4] Keys: Invalid Payload Options [ 5] Keys: Add Key Descriptor Field [ 6] Keys: Add Multiple Same [ 7] Keys: Change payload, auto update [ 8] Keys: Update, explicit update [ 9] Keys: Update, Clear [10] Keys: Add, Invalidate Keys [11] Keys: Add, Revoke Keys [12] Keys: Keyctl Describe [13] Keys: Clear [14] Keys: No Encrypt [15] Keys: Unique KeyIDs [16] Keys: Get Max KeyIDs [17] Encrypt: Parameter Alignment [18] Encrypt: Change Protections [19] Encrypt: Swap Keys [20] Encrypt: Counters Same Key [21] Encrypt: Counters Diff Key [22] Encrypt: Counters Holes [23] Flow: Switch key no data [24] Flow: Switch key multi VMAs [25] Flow: Switch No Key to Any Key [26] Flow: madvise [27] Flow: Invalidate In Use Key Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov --- .../selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c | 433 ++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c | 266 +++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c | 526 ++++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c | 300 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 1525 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..735d5da89d29 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/encrypt_tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,433 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* x86 MKTME Encrypt API Tests */ + +/* Address & length parameters to encrypt_mprotect() must be page aligned */ +void test_param_alignment(void) +{ + size_t datalen = PAGE_SIZE * 2; + key_serial_t key; + int ret, i; + char *buf; + + key = add_key("mktme", "keyname", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror("test_param_alignment"); + return; + } + buf = (char *)mmap(NULL, datalen, PROT_NONE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + + /* Fail if addr is not page aligned */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf + 100, datalen / 2, PROT_NONE, + key); + if (!ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: addr is not page aligned\n"); + + /* Fail if len is not page aligned */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf, 9, PROT_NONE, key); + if (!ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: len is not page aligned."); + + /* Fail if both addr and len are not page aligned */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf + 100, datalen + 100, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, key); + if (!ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: addr and len are not page aligned\n"); + + /* Success if both addr and len are page aligned */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf, datalen, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, key); + + if (ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Fail: addr and len are both page aligned\n"); + + ret = munmap(buf, datalen); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed on key [%d]\n", key); +} + +/* + * Do encrypt_mprotect and follow with classic mprotects. + * KeyID should remain unchanged. + */ +void test_change_protections(void) +{ + unsigned int keyid, check_keyid; + key_serial_t key; + void *ptra; + int ret, i; + + const int prots[] = { + PROT_NONE, PROT_READ, PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, + }; + + key = add_key("mktme", "testkey", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key == -1) { + perror(__func__); + return; + } + ptra = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, + -1, 0); + if (!ptra) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: mmap failed."); + goto revoke_key; + } + /* Encrypt Memory */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptra, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, key); + if (ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: encrypt_mprotect [%d]\n", ret); + + /* Remember the assigned KeyID */ + keyid = find_smaps_keyid((unsigned long)ptra); + + /* Classic mprotects() should not change KeyID. */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(prots); i++) { + ret = mprotect(ptra, PAGE_SIZE, prots[i]); + if (ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: encrypt_mprotect [%d]\n", ret); + + check_keyid = find_smaps_keyid((unsigned long)ptra); + if (keyid != check_keyid) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: keyid change not expected\n"); + }; +free_memory: + ret = munmap(ptra, PAGE_SIZE); +revoke_key: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed. [%d]\n", key); +} + +/* + * Make one mapping and create a bunch of keys. + * Encrypt that one mapping repeatedly with different keys. + * Verify the KeyID changes in smaps. + */ +void test_key_swap(void) +{ + unsigned int prev_keyid, next_keyid; + int maxswaps = max_keyids / 2; /* Not too many swaps */ + key_serial_t key[maxswaps]; + long size = PAGE_SIZE; + int keys_available = 0; + char name[12]; + void *ptra; + int i, ret; + + for (i = 0; i < maxswaps; i++) { + sprintf(name, "mk_swap_%d", i); + key[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key[i] == -1) { + perror(__func__); + goto free_keys; + } else { + keys_available++; + } + } + + printf(" Info: created %d keys\n", keys_available); + ptra = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + if (!ptra) { + perror("mmap"); + goto free_keys; + } + prev_keyid = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < keys_available; i++) { + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptra, size, + PROT_NONE, key[i]); + if (ret) { + perror("encrypt_mprotect"); + goto free_memory; + } + + next_keyid = find_smaps_keyid((unsigned long)ptra); + if (prev_keyid == next_keyid) + fprintf(stderr, "Error %s: expected new keyid\n", + __func__); + prev_keyid = next_keyid; + } +free_memory: + ret = munmap(ptra, size); + +free_keys: + for (i = 0; i < keys_available; i++) { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]) == -1) + perror(__func__); + } +} + +/* + * These may not be doing as orig planned. Need to check that key is + * invalidated and then gets destroyed when last map is removed. + */ +void test_counters_same(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + int count = 4; + void *ptr[count]; + int ret, i; + + /* Get 4 pieces of memory */ + i = count; + while (i--) { + ptr[i] = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + if (!ptr[i]) + perror("mmap"); + } + /* Protect with same key */ + key = add_key("mktme", "mk_same", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + goto free_mem; + } + i = count; + while (i--) { + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[i], PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_NONE, key); + if (ret) + perror("encrypt_mprotect"); + } + /* Discard Key & Unmap Memory (order irrelevant) */ + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed.\n"); +free_mem: + i = count; + while (i--) + ret = munmap(ptr[i], PAGE_SIZE); +} + +void test_counters_diff(void) +{ + int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + long size = PAGE_SIZE; + int ret, i; + int loop = 4; + char name[12]; + void *ptr[loop]; + key_serial_t diffkey[loop]; + + i = loop; + while (i--) + ptr[i] = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, + -1, 0); + i = loop; + while (i--) { + sprintf(name, "cheese_%d", i); + diffkey[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options_USER, + strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[i], size, prot, + diffkey[i]); + if (ret) + perror("encrypt_mprotect"); + } + + i = loop; + while (i--) + ret = munmap(ptr[i], PAGE_SIZE); + + i = loop; + while (i--) { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, diffkey[i]) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed key:%d\n", + diffkey[i]); + } +} + +void test_counters_holes(void) +{ + int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + long size = PAGE_SIZE; + int ret, i; + int loop = 6; + void *ptr[loop]; + key_serial_t samekey; + + samekey = add_key("mktme", "gouda", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + i = loop; + while (i--) { + ptr[i] = mmap(NULL, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, + -1, 0); + if (i % 2) { + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[i], size, prot, + samekey); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + } + } + + i = loop; + while (i--) + ret = munmap(ptr[i], size); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, samekey) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed\n"); +} + +/* + * Try on SIMICs. See is SIMICs 'a1a1' thing does the trick. + * May need real hardware. + * One buffer -> encrypt entirety w one key + * Same buffer -> encrypt in pieces w different keys + */ +void test_split(void) +{ + int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + int ret, i; + int pieces = 10; + size_t len = PAGE_SIZE; + char name[12]; + char *buf; + key_serial_t firstkey; + key_serial_t diffkey[pieces]; + + /* get one piece of memory, protect it, memset it */ + buf = (char *)mmap(NULL, len, PROT_NONE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + + firstkey = add_key("mktme", "firstkey", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + firstkey); + + if (ret) { + printf("firstkey mprotect error:%d\n", ret); + goto free_mem; + } + + memset(buf, 9, len); + /* + * Encrypt pieces of buf with different encryption keys. + * Expect to see the data in those pieces zero'd + */ + for (i = 0; i < pieces; i++) { + sprintf(name, "cheese_%d", i); + diffkey[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, (buf + (i * len)), len, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, diffkey[i]); + if (ret) + printf("diff key mprotect error:%d\n", ret); + else + printf("done protecting w i:%d key[%d]\n", i, + diffkey[i]); + } + printf("SIMICs - this should NOT be all 'f's.\n"); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + printf("-%x", buf[i]); + printf("\n"); + + getchar(); + i = pieces; + for (i = 0; i < pieces; i++) { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, diffkey[i]) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "invalidate failed key:%d\n", + diffkey[i]); + } + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, firstkey) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "invalidate failed on key:%d\n", firstkey); +free_mem: + ret = munmap(buf, len); +} + +void test_well_suited(void) +{ + int prot; + long size = PAGE_SIZE; + int ret, i; + int loop = 6; + void *ptr[loop]; + key_serial_t key; + void *addr, *first; + + /* mmap alternating protections so that we get loop# of vma's */ + i = loop; + /* map the first one */ + first = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + + addr = first + PAGE_SIZE; + i--; + while (i--) { + prot = (i % 2) ? PROT_READ : PROT_WRITE; + ptr[i] = mmap(addr, size, prot, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, + -1, 0); + addr = addr + PAGE_SIZE; + } + /* Protect with same key */ + key = add_key("mktme", "mk_suited954", options_USER, + strlen(options_USER), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + /* Changing FLAGS and adding KEY */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[0], (loop * PAGE_SIZE), + PROT_EXEC, key); + if (ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: encrypt_mprotect [%d]\n", ret); + + i = loop; + while (i--) + ret = munmap(ptr[i], size); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed\n"); +} + +void test_not_suited(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int prot; + int protA = PROT_READ; + int protB = PROT_WRITE; + int flagsA = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE; + int flagsB = MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS; + int flags; + int ret, i; + int loop = 6; + void *ptr[loop]; + key_serial_t key; + + printf("loop count [%d]\n", loop); + + /* mmap alternating protections so that we get loop# of vma's */ + i = loop; + while (i--) { + prot = (i % 2) ? PROT_READ : PROT_WRITE; + if (i == 2) + flags = flagsB; + else + flags = flagsA; + ptr[i] = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, prot, flags, -1, 0); + } + + /* protect with same key */ + key = add_key("mktme", "mk_notsuited", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + /* Changing FLAGS and adding KEY */ + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[0], (loop * PAGE_SIZE), + PROT_EXEC, key); + if (!ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: expected encrypt_mprotect to fail.\n"); + + i = loop; + while (i--) + ret = munmap(ptr[i], PAGE_SIZE); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed.\n"); +} + diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..87b17d3bf142 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/flow_tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * x86 MKTME: API Tests + * + * Flow Tests either + * 1) Validate some interaction between the 2 API's: Key & Encrypt + * 2) or, Validate code flows, scenarios, known/fixed issues. + */ + +/* + * Userspace Keys with outstanding memory mappings can be discarded, + * (discarded == revoke, invalidate, expire, unlink) + * The paired KeyID will not be freed for reuse until the last memory + * mapping is unmapped. + */ +void test_discard_in_use_key(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + void *ptra; + int ret; + + key = add_key("mktme", "discard-test", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror("add key"); + return; + } + ptra = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, + -1, 0); + if (!ptra) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: mmap failed. "); + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalidate failed. Key:%d\n", + key); + return; + } + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptra, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, key); + if (ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: encrypt_mprotect: %d\n", ret); + goto free_memory; + } + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) != 0) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: test_revoke_in_use_key\n"); +free_memory: + ret = munmap(ptra, PAGE_SIZE); +} + +/* TODO: Can this be made useful? Used to reproduce a trace in Kai's setup. */ +void test_kai_madvise(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + void *ptra; + int ret; + + key = add_key("mktme", "testkey", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + return; + } + + /* TODO wanted MAP_FIXED here - but kept failing to mmap */ + ptra = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); + if (!ptra) { + perror("failed to mmap"); + goto revoke_key; + } + + ret = madvise(ptra, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE); + if (ret) + perror("madvise err mergeable"); + + if ((madvise(ptra, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE)) != 0) + perror("madvise err hugepage"); + + if ((madvise(ptra, PAGE_SIZE, MADV_DONTFORK)) != 0) + perror("madvise err dontfork"); + + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptra, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, key); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + + ret = munmap(ptra, PAGE_SIZE); +revoke_key: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "invalidate failed on key [%d]\n", key); +} + +void test_one_simple_round_trip(void) +{ + long size = PAGE_SIZE * 10; + key_serial_t key; + void *ptra; + int ret; + + key = add_key("mktme", "testkey", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + return; + } + + ptra = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + if (!ptra) { + perror("failed to mmap"); + goto revoke_key; + } + + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptra, size, PROT_NONE, key); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + + ret = munmap(ptra, size); +revoke_key: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "revoke failed on key [%d]\n", key); +} + +void test_switch_key_no_data(void) +{ + key_serial_t keyA, keyB; + int ret, i; + void *buf; + + /* + * Program 2 keys: Protect with one, protect with other + */ + keyA = add_key("mktme", "keyA", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (keyA == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + return; + } + keyB = add_key("mktme", "keyB", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (keyB == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + return; + } + buf = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, + -1, 0); + if (!buf) { + perror("mmap error"); + goto revoke_key; + } + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, keyA); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, keyB); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + +free_memory: + ret = munmap(buf, PAGE_SIZE); +revoke_key: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, keyA) == -1) + printf("revoke failed on key [%d]\n", keyA); + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, keyB) == -1) + printf("revoke failed on key [%d]\n", keyB); +} + +void test_switch_key_mult_vmas(void) +{ + int prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE; + long size = PAGE_SIZE; + int ret, i; + int loop = 12; + void *ptr[loop]; + key_serial_t firstkey; + key_serial_t nextkey; + + firstkey = add_key("mktme", "gouda", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + nextkey = add_key("mktme", "ricotta", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + i = loop; + while (i--) { + ptr[i] = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + if (i % 2) { + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[i], + size, prot, firstkey); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + } + } + i = loop; + while (i--) { + if (i % 2) { + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[i], size, prot, + nextkey); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + } + } + i = loop; + while (i--) + ret = munmap(ptr[i], size); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, nextkey) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "invalidate failed key %d\n", nextkey); + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, firstkey) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "invalidate failed key %d\n", firstkey); +} + +/* Write to buf with no encrypt key, then encrypt buf */ +void test_switch_key0_to_key(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + size_t datalen = PAGE_SIZE; + char *buf_1, *buf_2; + int ret, i; + + key = add_key("mktme", "keyA", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + return; + } + buf_1 = (char *)mmap(NULL, datalen, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + if (!buf_1) { + perror("failed to mmap"); + goto inval_key; + } + buf_2 = (char *)mmap(NULL, datalen, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + if (!buf_2) { + perror("failed to mmap"); + goto inval_key; + } + memset(buf_1, 9, datalen); + memset(buf_2, 9, datalen); + + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, buf_1, datalen, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, key); + if (ret) + perror("mprotect error"); + + if (!memcmp(buf_1, buf_2, sizeof(buf_1))) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: bufs should not have matched\n"); + +free_memory: + ret = munmap(buf_1, datalen); + ret = munmap(buf_2, datalen); +inval_key: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "invalidate failed on key [%d]\n", key); +} + +void test_zero_page(void) +{ + /* + * write access to the zero page, gets replaced with a newly + * allocated page. + * Can this be seen in smaps? + */ +} + diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ff4c18dbf533 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/key_tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,526 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Testing payload options + * + * Invalid options should return -EINVAL, not a Key. + * TODO This is just checking for the Key. + * Add a check for the actual -EINVAL return. + * + * Invalid option cases are grouped based on why they are invalid. + * Valid option cases are one large array of expected goodness + * + */ +const char *bad_type_tail = "algorithm=aes-xts-128 key=12345678123456781234567812345678 tweak=12345678123456781234567812345678"; +const char *bad_type[] = { + "type=", /* missing */ + "type=cpu, type=cpu", /* duplicate good */ + "type=cpu, type=user", + "type=user, type=user", + "type=user, type=cpu", + "type=cp", /* spelling */ + "type=cpus", + "type=pu", + "type=cpucpu", + "type=useruser", + "type=use", + "type=users", + "type=used", + "type=User", /* case */ + "type=USER", + "type=UsEr", + "type=CPU", + "type=Cpu", +}; + +const char *bad_alg_tail = "type=cpu"; +const char *bad_algorithm[] = { + "algorithm=", + "algorithm=aes-xts-12", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128aes-xts-128", + "algorithm=es-xts-128", + "algorithm=bad", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128-xxxx", + "algorithm=xxx-aes-xts-128", +}; + +const char *bad_key_tail = "type=cpu algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=12345678123456781234567812345678"; +const char *bad_key[] = { + "key=", + "key=0", + "key=ababababababab", + "key=blah", + "key=0123333456789abcdef", + "key=abracadabra", + "key=-1", +}; + +const char *bad_tweak_tail = "type=cpu algorithm=aes-xts-128 key=12345678123456781234567812345678"; +const char *bad_tweak[] = { + "tweak=", + "tweak=ab", + "tweak=bad", + "tweak=-1", + "tweak=000000000000000", +}; + +/* Bad, missing, repeating tokens and bad overall payload length */ +const char *bad_other[] = { + "", + " ", + "a ", + "algorithm= tweak= type= key=", + "key=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa tweak=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=0000000000000000 tweak=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa key=0000000000000000 type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=0000000000000000 key=0000000000000000 key=0000000000000000 type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=0000000000000000 key=0000000000000000 type=cpu type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=0000000000000000 key=0000000000000000 type=cpu type=user", + "tweak=0000000000000000011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111", +}; + +void test_invalid_options(const char *bad_options[], unsigned int size, + const char *good_tail, char *descrip) +{ + key_serial_t key[size]; + char options[512]; + char name[15]; + int i, ret; + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + sprintf(name, "mk_inv_%d", i); + sprintf(options, "%s %s", bad_options[i], good_tail); + + key[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options, + strlen(options), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key[i] > 0) + fprintf(stderr, "Error %s: [%s] accepted.\n", + descrip, bad_options[i]); + } + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if (key[i] > 0) { + ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]); + if (ret == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: [%d]\n", + key[i]); + } + } +} + +void test_keys_invalid_options(void) +{ + test_invalid_options(bad_type, ARRAY_SIZE(bad_type), + bad_type_tail, "Invalid Type Option"); + test_invalid_options(bad_algorithm, ARRAY_SIZE(bad_algorithm), + bad_alg_tail, "Invalid Algorithm Option"); + test_invalid_options(bad_key, ARRAY_SIZE(bad_key), + bad_key_tail, "Invalid Key Option"); + test_invalid_options(bad_tweak, ARRAY_SIZE(bad_tweak), + bad_tweak_tail, "Invalid Tweak Option"); + test_invalid_options(bad_other, ARRAY_SIZE(bad_other), + NULL, "Invalid Option"); +} + +const char *valid_options[] = { + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=user key=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef tweak=abababababababababababababababab", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=user tweak=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef key=abababababababababababababababab", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=user key=01010101010101010101010101010101 tweak=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=01010101010101010101010101010101 type=user key=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 key=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa tweak=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa type=user", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0000000000000000 key=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0000000000000000 type=user", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=cpu key=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0123456789abcdef tweak=abababaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaababababab", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=cpu tweak=0123456aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa789abcdef key=abababaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaababababab", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=cpu key=010101aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0101010101 tweak=01234567aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa89abcdef", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=01010101aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa01010101 type=cpu key=012345aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa6789abcdef", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 key=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa tweak=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=00000000000000000000000000000000 type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 key=00000000000000000000000000000000 type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=00000000000000000000000000000000 key=00000000000000000000000000000000 type=cpu", + "algorithm=aes-xts-128 tweak=00000000000000000000000000000000 key=00000000000000000000000000000000 type=cpu", +}; + +void test_keys_valid_options(void) +{ + char name[15]; + int i, ret; + key_serial_t key[ARRAY_SIZE(valid_options)]; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(valid_options); i++) { + sprintf(name, "mk_val_%d", i); + key[i] = add_key("mktme", name, valid_options[i], + strlen(valid_options[i]), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key[i] <= 0) + fprintf(stderr, "Fail valid option: [%s]\n", + valid_options[i]); + } + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(valid_options); i++) { + if (key[i] > 0) { + ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]); + if (ret) + fprintf(stderr, "Invalidate failed key[%d]\n", + key[i]); + } + } +} + +/* + * key_serial_t add_key(const char *type, const char *description, + * const void *payload, size_t plen, + * key_serial_t keyring); + * + * The Kernel Key Service should validate this. But, let's validate + * some basic syntax. MKTME Keys does NOT propose a description based + * on type and payload if no description is provided. (Some other key + * types do make that 'proposal'.) + */ + +void test_keys_descriptor(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + + key = add_key("mktme", NULL, options_CPU_long, strlen(options_CPU_long), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (errno != EINVAL) + fprintf(stderr, "Fail: expected EINVAL with NULL descriptor\n"); + + if (key > 0) + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + + key = add_key("mktme", "", options_CPU_long, strlen(options_CPU_long), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (errno != EINVAL) + fprintf(stderr, + "Fail: expected EINVAL with empty descriptor\n"); + + if (key > 0) + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); +} + +/* + * Test: Add multiple keys with with same descriptor + * + * Expect that the same Key Handle (key_serial_t) will be returned + * on each subsequent request for the same key. This is treated like + * a key update. + */ + +void test_keys_add_mult_same(void) +{ + int i, inval, num_keys = 5; + key_serial_t key[num_keys]; + + for (i = 1; i <= num_keys; i++) { + key[i] = add_key("mktme", "multiple_keys", + options_USER, + strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (i > 1) + if (key[i] != key[i - 1]) { + fprintf(stderr, "Fail: expected same key.\n"); + inval = i; /* maybe i keys to invalidate */ + goto out; + } + } + inval = 1; /* if all works correctly, only 1 key to invalidate */ +out: + for (i = 1; i <= inval; i++) { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + } +} + +/* + * Add two keys with the same descriptor but different payloads. + * The result should be one key with the payload from the second + * add_key() request. Key Service recognizes the duplicate + * descriptor and allows the payload to be updated. + * + * mktme key type chooses not to support the keyctl read command. + * This means we cannot read the key payloads back to compare. + * That piece can only be verified in debug mode. + */ +void test_keys_change_payload(void) +{ + key_serial_t key_a, key_b; + + key_a = add_key("mktme", "changepay", options_USER, + strlen(options_USER), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key_a == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to add test key_a: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + return; + } + key_b = add_key("mktme", "changepay", options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key_b == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to add test key_b: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if (key_a != key_b) { + fprintf(stderr, "Fail: expected same key, got new key.\n"); + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key_b) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + } +out: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key_a) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); +} + +/* Add a key, then discard via method parameter: revoke or invalidate */ +void test_keys_add_discard(int method) +{ + key_serial_t key; + int i; + + key = add_key("mktme", "mtest_add_discard", options_USER, + strlen(options_USER), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key < 0) + perror("add_key"); + + if (keyctl(method, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key %s failed: %s\n", + ((method == KEYCTL_INVALIDATE) ? "invalidate" + : "revoke"), strerror(errno)); +} + +void test_keys_add_invalidate(void) +{ + test_keys_add_discard(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE); +} + +void test_keys_add_revoke(void) +{ + if (remove_gc_delay()) { + fprintf(stderr, "Skipping REVOKE test. Cannot set gc_delay.\n"); + return; + } + test_keys_add_discard(KEYCTL_REVOKE); + restore_gc_delay(); +} + +void test_keys_describe(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + char buf[256]; + int ret; + + key = add_key("mktme", "describe_this_key", options_USER, + strlen(options_USER), KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Add_key failed.\n"); + return; + } + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE, key, buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: KEYCTL_DESCRIBE failed\n", __func__); + goto revoke_key; + } + if (strncmp(buf, "mktme", 5)) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: mktme descriptor missing.\n"); + +revoke_key: + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); +} + +void test_keys_update_explicit(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + + key = add_key("mktme", "testkey", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror("add_key"); + return; + } + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE, key, options_CPU_long, + strlen(options_CPU_long)) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: Update key failed\n"); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); +} + +void test_keys_update_clear(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + + key = add_key("mktme", "testkey", options_USER, strlen(options_USER), + KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE, key, options_CLEAR, + strlen(options_CLEAR)) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "update: clear key failed\n"); + + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); +} + +void test_keys_no_encrypt(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + + key = add_key("mktme", "no_encrypt_key", options_NOENCRYPT, + strlen(options_USER), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: add_key type=no_encrypt failed.\n"); + return; + } + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)); +} + +void test_keys_unique_keyid(void) +{ + /* + * exists[] array must be of mktme_nr_keyids + 1 size, else the + * uniqueness test will fail. OK for max_keyids under test to be + * less than mktme_nr_keyids. + */ + unsigned int exists[max_keyids + 1]; + unsigned int keyids[max_keyids + 1]; + key_serial_t key[max_keyids + 1]; + void *ptr[max_keyids + 1]; + int keys_available = 0; + char name[12]; + int i, ret; + + /* Get as many keys as possible */ + for (i = 1; i <= max_keyids; i++) { + sprintf(name, "mk_unique_%d", i); + key[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options_CPU_short, + strlen(options_CPU_short), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key[i] > 0) + keys_available++; + } + /* Create mappings, encrypt them, and find the assigned KeyIDs */ + for (i = 1; i <= keys_available; i++) { + ptr[i] = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); + ret = syscall(sys_encrypt_mprotect, ptr[i], PAGE_SIZE, + PROT_NONE, key[i]); + keyids[i] = find_smaps_keyid((unsigned long)ptr[i]); + } + /* Verify the KeyID's are unique */ + memset(exists, 0, sizeof(exists)); + for (i = 1; i <= keys_available; i++) { + if (exists[keyids[i]]) + fprintf(stderr, "Error: duplicate keyid %d\n", + keyids[i]); + exists[keyids[i]] = 1; + } + + /* Clean up */ + for (i = 1; i <= keys_available; i++) { + ret = munmap(ptr[i], PAGE_SIZE); + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Invalidate failed Serial:%d\n", + key[i]); + } + sleep(1); /* Rest a bit while keys get freed. */ +} + +void test_keys_get_max_keyids(void) +{ + key_serial_t key[max_keyids + 1]; + int keys_available = 0; + char name[12]; + int i, ret; + + for (i = 1; i <= max_keyids; i++) { + sprintf(name, "mk_get63_%d", i); + key[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options_CPU_short, + strlen(options_CPU_short), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key[i] > 0) + keys_available++; + } + + fprintf(stderr, " Info: got %d of %d system keys\n", + keys_available, max_keyids); + + for (i = 1; i <= keys_available; i++) { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Invalidate failed Serial:%d\n", + key[i]); + } + sleep(1); /* Rest a bit while keys get freed. */ +} + +/* + * TODO: Run out of keys, release 1, grab it, repeat + * This test in not completed and is not in the run list. + */ +void test_keys_max_out(void) +{ + key_serial_t key[max_keyids + 1]; + int keys_available; + char name[12]; + int i, ret; + + /* Get all the keys or as many as possible: keys_available */ + for (i = 1; i <= max_keyids; i++) { + sprintf(name, "mk_max_%d", i); + key[i] = add_key("mktme", name, options_CPU_short, + strlen(options_CPU_short), + KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING); + if (key[i] < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "failed to get key[%d]\n", i); + continue; + } + } + keys_available = i - 1; + if (keys_available < max_keyids) + printf("Error: only got %d keys, expected %d\n", + keys_available, max_keyids); + + for (i = 1; i <= keys_available; i++) { + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key[i]) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Invalidate failed key:%d\n", key[i]); + } +} + +/* Add each type of key */ +void test_keys_add_each_type(void) +{ + key_serial_t key; + int i; + + const char *options[] = { + options_CPU_short, options_CPU_long, options_USER, + options_CLEAR, options_NOENCRYPT + }; + static const char *opt_name[] = { + "add_key cpu_short", "add_key cpu_long", "add_key user", + "add_key clear", "add_key no-encrypt" + }; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(options); i++) { + key = add_key("mktme", opt_name[i], options[i], + strlen(options[i]), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); + + if (key == -1) { + perror(opt_name[i]); + } else { + perror(opt_name[i]); + if (keyctl(KEYCTL_INVALIDATE, key) == -1) + fprintf(stderr, "Key invalidate failed: %d\n", + key); + } + } +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6409ccf94d4a --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/mktme/mktme_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Tests x86 MKTME Multi-Key Memory Protection + * + * COMPILE w keyutils library ==> cc -o mktest mktme_test.c -lkeyutils + * + * Test requires capability of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, or CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + * $ sudo setcap 'CAP_SYS_RESOURCE+ep' mktest + * + * Some tests may require root privileges because the test needs to + * remove the garbage collection delay /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay + * while testing. This keeps the tests (and system) from appearing to + * be out of keys when keys are simply awaiting the next scheduled + * garbage collection. + * + * Documentation/x86/mktme.rst + * + * There are examples in here of: + * * how to use the Kernel Key Service MKTME API to allocate keys + * * how to use the MKTME Memory Encryption API to encrypt memory + * + * Adding Tests: + * o Each test should run independently and clean up after itself. + * o There are no dependencies among tests. + * o Tests that use a lot of keys, should consider adding sleep(), + * so that the next test isn't key-starved. + * o Make no assumptions about the order in which tests will run. + * o There are shared defines that can be used for setting + * payload options. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x))) +#define PAGE_SIZE sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) +#define sys_encrypt_mprotect 335 + +/* TODO get this from kernel. Add to /proc/sys/kernel/keys/ */ +int max_keyids = 63; + +/* Use these pre-defined options to simplify the add_key() setup */ +char *options_CPU_short = "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=cpu"; +char *options_CPU_long = "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=cpu key=12345678912345671234567891234567 tweak=12345678912345671234567891234567"; +char *options_USER = "algorithm=aes-xts-128 type=user key=12345678912345671234567891234567 tweak=12345678912345671234567891234567"; +char *options_CLEAR = "type=clear"; +char *options_NOENCRYPT = "type=no-encrypt"; + +/* Helper to check Encryption_KeyID in proc/self/smaps */ +static FILE *seek_to_smaps_entry(unsigned long addr) +{ + FILE *file; + char *line = NULL; + size_t size = 0; + unsigned long start, end; + char perms[5]; + unsigned long offset; + char dev[32]; + unsigned long inode; + char path[BUFSIZ]; + + file = fopen("/proc/self/smaps", "r"); + if (!file) { + perror("fopen smaps"); + _exit(1); + } + while (getline(&line, &size, file) > 0) { + if (sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx %s %lx %s %lu %s\n", + &start, &end, perms, &offset, dev, &inode, path) < 6) + goto next; + + if (start <= addr && addr < end) + goto out; +next: + free(line); + line = NULL; + size = 0; + } + fclose(file); + file = NULL; +out: + free(line); + return file; +} + +/* Find the KeyID for this addr from /proc/self/smaps */ +unsigned int find_smaps_keyid(unsigned long addr) +{ + unsigned int keyid = 0; + char *line = NULL; + size_t size = 0; + FILE *smaps; + + smaps = seek_to_smaps_entry(addr); + if (!smaps) { + printf("Unable to parse /proc/self/smaps\n"); + goto out; + } + while (getline(&line, &size, smaps) > 0) { + if (!strstr(line, "KeyID:")) { + free(line); + line = NULL; + size = 0; + continue; + } + if (sscanf(line, "KeyID: %5u\n", &keyid) < 1) + printf("Unable to parse smaps for KeyID:%s\n", line); + break; + } +out: + free(line); + fclose(smaps); + return keyid; +} + +/* + * Set the garbage collection delay to 0, so that keys are quickly + * available for re-use while running the selftests. + * + * Most tests use INVALIDATE to remove a key, which has no delay by + * design. But, revoke, unlink, and timeout still have a delay, so + * they should use this. + */ +char current_gc_delay[10] = {0}; +static inline int remove_gc_delay(void) +{ + int fd; + + fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay", O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK); + if (fd < 0) { + perror("Failed to open /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay"); + return -1; + } + if (read(fd, current_gc_delay, sizeof(current_gc_delay)) <= 0) { + perror("Failed to read /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay"); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (write(fd, "0", sizeof(char)) != sizeof(char)) { + perror("Failed to write temp_gc_delay to gc_delay\n"); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + close(fd); + return 0; +} + +static inline void restore_gc_delay(void) +{ + int fd; + + fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay", O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK); + if (fd < 0) { + perror("Failed to open /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay"); + return; + } + if (write(fd, current_gc_delay, strlen(current_gc_delay)) != + strlen(current_gc_delay)) { + perror("Failed to restore gc_delay\n"); + close(fd); + return; + } + close(fd); +} + +/* + * The tests are sorted into 3 categories: + * key_test encrypt_test focus on their specific API + * flow_tests are special flows and regression tests of prior issue. + */ + +#include "key_tests.c" +#include "encrypt_tests.c" +#include "flow_tests.c" + +struct tlist { + const char *name; + void (*func)(); +}; + +static const struct tlist mktme_tests[] = { +{"Keys: Add each type key", test_keys_add_each_type }, +{"Flow: One simple roundtrip", test_one_simple_round_trip }, +{"Keys: Valid Payload Options", test_keys_valid_options }, +{"Keys: Invalid Payload Options", test_keys_invalid_options }, +{"Keys: Add Key Descriptor Field", test_keys_descriptor }, +{"Keys: Add Multiple Same", test_keys_add_mult_same }, +{"Keys: Change payload, auto update", test_keys_change_payload }, +{"Keys: Update, explicit update", test_keys_update_explicit }, +{"Keys: Update, Clear", test_keys_update_clear }, +{"Keys: Add, Invalidate Keys", test_keys_add_invalidate }, +{"Keys: Add, Revoke Keys", test_keys_add_revoke }, +{"Keys: Keyctl Describe", test_keys_describe }, +{"Keys: Clear", test_keys_update_clear }, +{"Keys: No Encrypt", test_keys_no_encrypt }, +{"Keys: Unique KeyIDs", test_keys_unique_keyid }, +{"Keys: Get Max KeyIDs", test_keys_get_max_keyids }, +{"Encrypt: Parameter Alignment", test_param_alignment }, +{"Encrypt: Change Protections", test_change_protections }, +{"Encrypt: Swap Keys", test_key_swap }, +{"Encrypt: Counters Same Key", test_counters_same }, +{"Encrypt: Counters Diff Key", test_counters_diff }, +{"Encrypt: Counters Holes", test_counters_holes }, +/* +{"Encrypt: Split", test_split }, +{"Encrypt: Well Suited", test_well_suited }, +{"Encrypt: Not Suited", test_not_suited }, +*/ +{"Flow: Switch key no data", test_switch_key_no_data }, +{"Flow: Switch key multi VMAs", test_switch_key_mult_vmas }, +{"Flow: Switch No Key to Any Key", test_switch_key0_to_key }, +{"Flow: madvise", test_kai_madvise }, +{"Flow: Invalidate In Use Key", test_discard_in_use_key }, +}; + +void print_usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: mktme_test [options]...\n" + " -a Run ALL tests\n" + " -t Run one test\n" + " -l List available tests\n" + " -h, -? Show this help\n" + ); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int test_selected = -1; + char printtest[12]; + int trace = 0; + int i, c, err; + char *temp; + + /* + * TODO: Default case needs to run 'selftests' - a + * curated set of tests that validate functionality but + * don't hog resources. + */ + c = getopt(argc, argv, "at:lph?"); + switch (c) { + case 'a': + test_selected = -1; + printf("Test Selected [ALL]\n"); + break; + case 't': + test_selected = strtoul(optarg, &temp, 10); + printf("Test Selected [%d]\n", test_selected); + break; + case 'l': + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_tests); i++) + printf("[%2d] %s\n", i + 1, + mktme_tests[i].name); + exit(0); + break; + case 'p': + trace = 1; + case 'h': + case '?': + default: + print_usage(); + exit(0); + } + +/* + * if (!cpu_has_mktme()) { + * printf("MKTME not supported on this system.\n"); + * exit(0); + * } + */ + if (trace) { + printf("Pausing: start trace on PID[%d]\n", (int)getpid()); + getchar(); + } + + if (test_selected == -1) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_tests); i++) { + printf("[%2d] %s\n", i + 1, mktme_tests[i].name); + mktme_tests[i].func(); + } + printf("\nTests Completed\n"); + + } else { + if (test_selected <= ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_tests)) { + printf("[%2d] %s\n", test_selected, + mktme_tests[test_selected - 1].name); + mktme_tests[test_selected - 1].func(); + printf("\nTest Completed\n"); + } + } + exit(0); +} -- 2.20.1