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Date:   Thu, 16 May 2019 08:46:28 +1000 (AEST)
From:   James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
cc:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "nhorman@redhat.com" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
        "npmccallum@redhat.com" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
        "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Subject: Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
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On Wed, 15 May 2019, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> > Why not just use an xattr, like security.sgx ?
> 
> Wouldn't this make it so that only someone with CAP_MAC_ADMIN could
> install an enclave?  I think that this decision should be left up the
> administrator, and it should be easy to set up a loose policy where
> anyone can load whatever enclave they want.  That's what would happen
> in my proposal if there was no LSM loaded or of the LSM policy didn't
> restrict what .sigstruct files were acceptable.
> 

You could try user.sigstruct, which does not require any privs.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>