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Date:   Thu, 16 May 2019 19:01:34 +0200
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] uapi, vfs: Change the mount API UAPI [ver #2]
To:     Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC:     David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-abi@vger.kernel.org
From:   Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Message-ID: <308AC02E-168C-4547-AF64-F98970B4368D@brauner.io>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
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On May 16, 2019 6:50:22 PM GMT+02:00, Al Viro <viro@zeniv=2Elinux=2Eorg=2Eu=
k> wrote:
>[linux-abi cc'd]
>
>On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 06:31:52PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 05:22:59PM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
>> > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:52:04PM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>> > >=20
>> > > Hi Linus, Al,
>> > >=20
>> > > Here are some patches that make changes to the mount API UAPI and
>two of
>> > > them really need applying, before -rc1 - if they're going to be
>applied at
>> > > all=2E
>> >=20
>> > I'm fine with 2--4, but I'm not convinced that cloexec-by-default
>crusade
>> > makes any sense=2E  Could somebody give coherent arguments in favour
>of
>> > abandoning the existing conventions?
>>=20
>> So as I said in the commit message=2E From a userspace perspective it's
>> more of an issue if one accidently leaks an fd to a task during exec=2E
>>=20
>> Also, most of the time one does not want to inherit an fd during an
>> exec=2E It is a hazzle to always have to specify an extra flag=2E
>>=20
>> As Al pointed out to me open() semantics are not going anywhere=2E
>Sure,
>> no argument there at all=2E
>> But the idea of making fds cloexec by default is only targeted at fds
>> that come from separate syscalls=2E fsopen(), open_tree_clone(), etc=2E
>they
>> all return fds independent of open() so it's really easy to have them
>> cloexec by default without regressing anyone and we also remove the
>need
>> for a bunch of separate flags for each syscall to turn them into
>> cloexec-fds=2E I mean, those for syscalls came with 4 separate flags to
>be
>> able to specify that the returned fd should be made cloexec=2E The
>other
>> way around, cloexec by default, fcntl() to remove the cloexec bit is
>way
>> saner imho=2E
>
>Re separate flags - it is, in principle, a valid argument=2E  OTOH, I'm
>not
>sure if they need to be separate - they all have the same value and
>I don't see any reason for that to change=2E=2E=2E
>
>Only tangentially related, but I wonder if something like
>close_range(from, to)
>would be a more useful approach=2E=2E=2E  That kind of open-coded loops i=
s
>not
>rare in userland and kernel-side code can do them much cheaper=2E=20
>Something
>like
>	/* that exec is sensitive */
>	unshare(CLONE_FILES);
>	/* we don't want anything past stderr here */
>	close_range(3, ~0U);
>	execve(=2E=2E=2E=2E);
>on the userland side of thing=2E  Comments?

Very much in favor of that!
That'd be a neat new addition=2E