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Date:   Thu, 16 May 2019 15:45:50 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "nhorman@redhat.com" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
        "npmccallum@redhat.com" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
        "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Subject: Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
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On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 02:02:58PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On May 15, 2019, at 10:16 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > There is a problem here though. Usually the enclave itself is just a
> > loader that then loads the application from outside source and creates
> > the executable pages from the content.
> >
> > A great example of this is Graphene that bootstraps unmodified Linux
> > applications to an enclave:
> >
> > https://github.com/oscarlab/graphene
> >
> 
> ISTM you should need EXECMEM or similar to run Graphene, then.

Agreed, Graphene is effectively running arbitrary enclave code.  I'm
guessing there is nothing that prevents extending/reworking Graphene to
allow generating the enclave ahead of time so as to avoid populating the
guts of the enclave at runtime, i.e. it's likely possible to run an
unmodified application in an enclave without EXECMEM if that's something
Graphene or its users really care about.