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From:   David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To:     "'Reshetova, Elena'" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
        Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CC:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
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        "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
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        "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
Thread-Topic: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
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Date:   Wed, 29 May 2019 10:51:41 +0000
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From: Reshetova, Elena
> Sent: 29 May 2019 11:14
....
> On related note: the current prng we have in kernel (prandom) is based on a
> *very old* style of prngs, which is basically 4 linear LFSRs xored together.

I'm no expert here (apart from some knowledge of LFRS/CRC) but
even adding the results of the 4 LFSR (instead of xor) will make
the generator much more secure (aka computationally expensive to
reverse) without affecting the randomness or repeat cycle.

FWIW if you are going to merge LFRS you probably want to clock
them different numbers of times (+ve or -ve) otherwise the
output 'mostly' shifts one bit per clock and the same bits
tend to get merged.

	David

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