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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 192si261320pfz.42.2019.05.29.10.30.16; Wed, 29 May 2019 10:30:33 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=y35pCSwk; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726173AbfE2R3L (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 29 May 2019 13:29:11 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33210 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726049AbfE2R3K (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 13:29:10 -0400 Received: from linux-8ccs (ip5f5adbeb.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de [95.90.219.235]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A2E4523F98; Wed, 29 May 2019 17:29:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1559150949; bh=EZaBASbLVSPzKT9S87kmsItloLE8FGVHD+GU6mj6B1A=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=y35pCSwkXComxugK3mRXLlbNyIJicS5FW5nhtVnN3+C1JaMUxiKM+gT1C12d/XlVy TklfWhVT55xKUewb+lqK/pyb27N9zxZwg1CdVc/7pMh4t2CkzcnwcsEJyEn7xo3NPu Qd4tCpD7e/LCNbLAk+YXcdC77WA0OdqCI6TpdC1g= Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 19:29:04 +0200 From: Jessica Yu To: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Steven Rostedt , Johannes Erdfelt , Joe Lawrence , Jiri Kosina , Miroslav Benes , Ingo Molnar , live-patching@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: Oops caused by race between livepatch and ftrace Message-ID: <20190529172904.GB12408@linux-8ccs> References: <20190520194915.GB1646@sventech.com> <90f78070-95ec-ce49-1641-19d061abecf4@redhat.com> <20190520210905.GC1646@sventech.com> <20190520211931.vokbqxkx5kb6k2bz@treble> <20190520173910.6da9ddaf@gandalf.local.home> <20190521141629.bmk5onsaab26qoaw@treble> <20190521104204.47d4e175@gandalf.local.home> <20190521164227.bxdff77kq7fgl5lp@treble> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190521164227.bxdff77kq7fgl5lp@treble> X-OS: Linux linux-8ccs 5.1.0-rc1-lp150.12.28-default+ x86_64 User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org +++ Josh Poimboeuf [21/05/19 11:42 -0500]: >On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 10:42:04AM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote: >> On Tue, 21 May 2019 09:16:29 -0500 >> Josh Poimboeuf wrote: >> >> > > Hmm, this may blow up with lockdep, as I believe we already have a >> > > locking dependency of: >> > > >> > > text_mutex -> ftrace_lock >> > > >> > > And this will reverses it. (kprobes appears to take the locks in this >> > > order). >> > > >> > > Perhaps have live kernel patching grab ftrace_lock? >> > >> > Where does kprobes call into ftrace with the text_mutex? I couldn't >> > find it. >> >> Hmm, maybe it doesn't. I was looking at the arm_kprobe_ftrace() but >> it doesn't call it with text_mutex(). >> >> Maybe it is fine, but we had better perform a lot of testing with >> lockdep on to make sure. > >Hm. I suppose using ftrace_lock might be less risky since that lock is >only used internally by ftrace (up until now). But I think it would >also make less sense because the text_mutex is supposed to protect code >patching. And presumably ftrace_lock is supposed to be ftrace-specific. > >Here's the latest patch, still using text_mutex. I added some lockdep >assertions to ensure the permissions toggling functions are always >called with text_mutex. It's running through 0-day right now. I can >try to run it through various tests with CONFIG_LOCKDEP. > > >From: Josh Poimboeuf >Subject: [PATCH] livepatch: Fix ftrace module text permissions race > >It's possible for livepatch and ftrace to be toggling a module's text >permissions at the same time, resulting in the following panic: > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc005b1d9 > #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode > #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation > PGD 3ea0c067 P4D 3ea0c067 PUD 3ea0e067 PMD 3cc13067 PTE 3b8a1061 > Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI > CPU: 1 PID: 453 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O K 5.2.0-rc1-a188339ca5 #1 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014 > RIP: 0010:apply_relocate_add+0xbe/0x14c > Code: fa 0b 74 21 48 83 fa 18 74 38 48 83 fa 0a 75 40 eb 08 48 83 38 00 74 33 eb 53 83 38 00 75 4e 89 08 89 c8 eb 0a 83 38 00 75 43 <89> 08 48 63 c1 48 39 c8 74 2e eb 48 83 38 00 75 32 48 29 c1 89 08 > RSP: 0018:ffffb223c00dbb10 EFLAGS: 00010246 > RAX: ffffffffc005b1d9 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8b200060 > RDX: 000000000000000b RSI: 0000004b0000000b RDI: ffff96bdfcd33000 > RBP: ffffb223c00dbb38 R08: ffffffffc005d040 R09: ffffffffc005c1f0 > R10: ffff96bdfcd33c40 R11: ffff96bdfcd33b80 R12: 0000000000000018 > R13: ffffffffc005c1f0 R14: ffffffffc005e708 R15: ffffffff8b2fbc74 > FS: 00007f5f447beba8(0000) GS:ffff96bdff900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > CR2: ffffffffc005b1d9 CR3: 000000003cedc002 CR4: 0000000000360ea0 > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > Call Trace: > klp_init_object_loaded+0x10f/0x219 > ? preempt_latency_start+0x21/0x57 > klp_enable_patch+0x662/0x809 > ? virt_to_head_page+0x3a/0x3c > ? kfree+0x8c/0x126 > patch_init+0x2ed/0x1000 [livepatch_test02] > ? 0xffffffffc0060000 > do_one_initcall+0x9f/0x1c5 > ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xc4/0xd4 > ? do_init_module+0x27/0x210 > do_init_module+0x5f/0x210 > load_module+0x1c41/0x2290 > ? fsnotify_path+0x3b/0x42 > ? strstarts+0x2b/0x2b > ? kernel_read+0x58/0x65 > __do_sys_finit_module+0x9f/0xc3 > ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x9f/0xc3 > __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x1c > do_syscall_64+0x52/0x61 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 > >The above panic occurs when loading two modules at the same time with >ftrace enabled, where at least one of the modules is a livepatch module: > >CPU0 CPU1 >klp_enable_patch() > klp_init_object_loaded() > module_disable_ro() > ftrace_module_enable() > ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process() > set_all_modules_text_ro() > klp_write_object_relocations() > apply_relocate_add() > *patches read-only code* - BOOM > >A similar race exists when toggling ftrace while loading a livepatch >module. > >Fix it by ensuring that the livepatch and ftrace code patching >operations -- and their respective permissions changes -- are protected >by the text_mutex. > >Reported-by: Johannes Erdfelt >Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf >--- > kernel/livepatch/core.c | 6 ++++++ > kernel/module.c | 9 +++++++++ > kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 10 +++++++++- > 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > >diff --git a/kernel/livepatch/core.c b/kernel/livepatch/core.c >index 91cd519756d3..2d17e6e364b5 100644 >--- a/kernel/livepatch/core.c >+++ b/kernel/livepatch/core.c >@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include >+#include > #include > #include "core.h" > #include "patch.h" >@@ -730,16 +731,21 @@ static int klp_init_object_loaded(struct klp_patch *patch, > struct klp_func *func; > int ret; > >+ mutex_lock(&text_mutex); >+ > module_disable_ro(patch->mod); > ret = klp_write_object_relocations(patch->mod, obj); > if (ret) { > module_enable_ro(patch->mod, true); >+ mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); > return ret; > } > > arch_klp_init_object_loaded(patch, obj); > module_enable_ro(patch->mod, true); > >+ mutex_unlock(&text_mutex); >+ > klp_for_each_func(obj, func) { > ret = klp_find_object_symbol(obj->name, func->old_name, > func->old_sympos, >diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c >index 6e6712b3aaf5..4d9f3281c0c5 100644 >--- a/kernel/module.c >+++ b/kernel/module.c >@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include >+#include > #include > #include "module-internal.h" > >@@ -1943,6 +1944,8 @@ static void frob_writable_data(const struct module_layout *layout, > /* livepatching wants to disable read-only so it can frob module. */ > void module_disable_ro(const struct module *mod) > { >+ lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex); >+ > if (!rodata_enabled) > return; > >@@ -1955,6 +1958,8 @@ void module_disable_ro(const struct module *mod) > > void module_enable_ro(const struct module *mod, bool after_init) > { >+ lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex); Hi Josh! The lockdep WARN_ON triggers when loading a module under a lockdep enabled kernel: [ 6.139583] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 102 at /home/ppyu/jeyu-linux/kernel/module.c:1961 module_enable_ro+0x121/0x130 [ 6.143641] Modules linked in: [ 6.144879] CPU: 0 PID: 102 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2+ #1 [ 6.147325] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fc-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 6.152046] RIP: 0010:module_enable_ro+0x121/0x130 [ 6.153986] Code: 48 c7 c6 70 97 05 81 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 b8 e2 ff ff be ff ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 40 b2 65 82 e8 a7 c7 fa ff 85 c0 0f 85 f8 fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 8b 05 9e a5 66 01 55 [ 6.161277] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000041fd18 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6.162919] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0002000 RCX: 000000000000000b [ 6.164783] RDX: ffff88803d793fc0 RSI: ffffffff8265b240 RDI: ffff88803d7947e8 [ 6.166820] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000007ade8 R09: ffffffff823989a6 [ 6.168579] R10: ffffc9000049c8e8 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffffffc00021c0 [ 6.169994] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: ffffc9000041fe78 [ 6.171390] FS: 00007fdc49708700(0000) GS:ffff88803d800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.173007] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.174047] CR2: 00007fdc496c0000 CR3: 000000003fb84000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 6.175168] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 6.176326] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 6.177384] Call Trace: [ 6.177730] load_module+0x1b96/0x2620 [ 6.178231] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x53/0x60 [ 6.178865] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2fa/0x350 [ 6.179497] ? __do_sys_init_module+0x135/0x170 [ 6.180097] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x40 [ 6.180594] __do_sys_init_module+0x135/0x170 [ 6.181177] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x1c0 [ 6.181681] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe It triggers since we call module_enable_ro() along the load_module() path to prepare for a coming module. We don't take the text_mutex there since we're not modifying any text, just memory protections. Leaving the lockdep assert in module_disable_ro() and set_all_modules_text_*() should be fine though, since I think livepatch and ftrace are the only users of those functions. Thanks, Jessica