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Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , Josh Poimboeuf , Mitsuo Hayasaka , Nicolai Stange , Sean Christopherson , x86-ml , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.9 068/128] x86/irq/64: Limit IST stack overflow check to #DB stack Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 20:06:40 -0700 Message-Id: <20190530030446.997261154@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190530030432.977908967@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190530030432.977908967@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [ Upstream commit 7dbcf2b0b770eeb803a416ee8dcbef78e6389d40 ] Commit 37fe6a42b343 ("x86: Check stack overflow in detail") added a broad check for the full exception stack area, i.e. it considers the full exception stack area as valid. That's wrong in two aspects: 1) It does not check the individual areas one by one 2) #DF, NMI and #MCE are not enabling interrupts which means that a regular device interrupt cannot happen in their context. In fact if a device interrupt hits one of those IST stacks that's a bug because some code path enabled interrupts while handling the exception. Limit the check to the #DB stack and consider all other IST stacks as 'overflow' or invalid. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Mitsuo Hayasaka Cc: Nicolai Stange Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160143.682135110@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c index bcd1b82c86e81..005e9a77a664e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c @@ -25,9 +25,18 @@ int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; /* * Probabilistic stack overflow check: * - * Only check the stack in process context, because everything else - * runs on the big interrupt stacks. Checking reliably is too expensive, - * so we just check from interrupts. + * Regular device interrupts can enter on the following stacks: + * + * - User stack + * + * - Kernel task stack + * + * - Interrupt stack if a device driver reenables interrupts + * which should only happen in really old drivers. + * + * - Debug IST stack + * + * All other contexts are invalid. */ static inline void stack_overflow_check(struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -52,8 +61,8 @@ static inline void stack_overflow_check(struct pt_regs *regs) return; oist = this_cpu_ptr(&orig_ist); - estack_top = (u64)oist->ist[0] - EXCEPTION_STKSZ + STACK_TOP_MARGIN; - estack_bottom = (u64)oist->ist[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1]; + estack_bottom = (u64)oist->ist[DEBUG_STACK]; + estack_top = estack_bottom - DEBUG_STKSZ + STACK_TOP_MARGIN; if (regs->sp >= estack_top && regs->sp <= estack_bottom) return; -- 2.20.1