Received: by 2002:a25:ab43:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id u61csp275964ybi; Wed, 29 May 2019 21:11:31 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxvOaAWr5laajzxBGStLxLedjlSe57n5ruXeHqohmomVKWcK35J6Z/j9Cp5+9w5ALI67Rld X-Received: by 2002:a63:5607:: with SMTP id k7mr1906284pgb.118.1559189491780; Wed, 29 May 2019 21:11:31 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1559189491; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=vWom1QIm4tz0Uxo8Pa3AmBnPAIt8g2PquLQ1oMafpeYDnQ3FWqE8aoLKuMH+RRRIhD 77Gf83RLpqBuP3N32D8MYBGMJilnaBhIC4yZtqA2Id6P8JIndtUmEYudJYOK3LU/UBJQ QMZ/OG/6jO6dvDeRcy42tsESWaNwseR3PKkeAeYwHlDCVK0y029SAnPhdxTjXJGvczZ3 utpp7+/qaSz7wL0qz6gxrtXdO8qwP+qnADUsu+b2HDb5A8ls2JzHn+AidpHFCfFZEfIu nEFtkhDTrh+MF2JYHOicy67GSSOWD5LMjXRlfdnM5ohBLO39cm3FqwA+S2dKePmxqbAQ q66Q== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=aab88zcdB7yigxtLtNZPcMtyCPjS/zvjUkWZGgHGPZQ=; b=sP+/BLzdU4GV1QBzuhGVwdni7YlLSfX/Oke25SF4xwcc0F6ASBaj4doS5k4GeJAXpD fBMekbQNOSG4ZpVDA/P5RZFsFkM7L4tdYcV0wkvLOUC7ZJTPGrJmBs2pKuLfvZ2Tbu70 KZ7+/L5jSCSfMFuIrcj3l1SplVOSVuE0bnJoI8fIOkBdejPMyXMhSCf2AGOifcFtG0U0 p4nuKG2D5HhWOUW8fetpoQSVE2cgrgBXOfRhFXRhjilpNi9etDb9oDyglUTlSQyL/oDM xw88ja6ws4XwkgXg6ql8TEHh/SrUI2FZ4Ho4Bian4pq9a612nsElbeCdmPaVEu2qfw8j EqEg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=wSaAiOOa; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l75si1967766pje.36.2019.05.29.21.11.14; Wed, 29 May 2019 21:11:31 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=wSaAiOOa; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727904AbfE3EIu (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 30 May 2019 00:08:50 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45326 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729541AbfE3DRR (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 23:17:17 -0400 Received: from localhost (ip67-88-213-2.z213-88-67.customer.algx.net [67.88.213.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CF42824694; Thu, 30 May 2019 03:17:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1559186236; bh=OxCAIHPoH18e4bJyXWJl8c54vD7RQRBMGt1OQmZG0A4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=wSaAiOOaK8BkP6OffpnGjmWaNkIwOU/7IsahveTHl4S+SHsViIQRdevXIN48IYypN GLT2ACdO0lSFfd0tiBYZ7apoUzQWPgbZxOtKbqlfazoxAddBWNt6wC6x86ytb+GWAr y1Z/tYY98RAdOKV8zLLqz8NE++gYvcbBkopc/HcM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , Josh Poimboeuf , Mitsuo Hayasaka , Nicolai Stange , Sean Christopherson , x86-ml , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.19 145/276] x86/irq/64: Limit IST stack overflow check to #DB stack Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 20:05:03 -0700 Message-Id: <20190530030534.711574134@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190530030523.133519668@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190530030523.133519668@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [ Upstream commit 7dbcf2b0b770eeb803a416ee8dcbef78e6389d40 ] Commit 37fe6a42b343 ("x86: Check stack overflow in detail") added a broad check for the full exception stack area, i.e. it considers the full exception stack area as valid. That's wrong in two aspects: 1) It does not check the individual areas one by one 2) #DF, NMI and #MCE are not enabling interrupts which means that a regular device interrupt cannot happen in their context. In fact if a device interrupt hits one of those IST stacks that's a bug because some code path enabled interrupts while handling the exception. Limit the check to the #DB stack and consider all other IST stacks as 'overflow' or invalid. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Mitsuo Hayasaka Cc: Nicolai Stange Cc: Sean Christopherson Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160143.682135110@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c index 0469cd078db15..b50ac9c7397bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c @@ -26,9 +26,18 @@ int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; /* * Probabilistic stack overflow check: * - * Only check the stack in process context, because everything else - * runs on the big interrupt stacks. Checking reliably is too expensive, - * so we just check from interrupts. + * Regular device interrupts can enter on the following stacks: + * + * - User stack + * + * - Kernel task stack + * + * - Interrupt stack if a device driver reenables interrupts + * which should only happen in really old drivers. + * + * - Debug IST stack + * + * All other contexts are invalid. */ static inline void stack_overflow_check(struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -53,8 +62,8 @@ static inline void stack_overflow_check(struct pt_regs *regs) return; oist = this_cpu_ptr(&orig_ist); - estack_top = (u64)oist->ist[0] - EXCEPTION_STKSZ + STACK_TOP_MARGIN; - estack_bottom = (u64)oist->ist[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1]; + estack_bottom = (u64)oist->ist[DEBUG_STACK]; + estack_top = estack_bottom - DEBUG_STKSZ + STACK_TOP_MARGIN; if (regs->sp >= estack_top && regs->sp <= estack_bottom) return; -- 2.20.1