Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Date:   Tue, 4 Jun 2019 00:08:25 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
        William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
        "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "nhorman@redhat.com" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
        "npmccallum@redhat.com" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
        "Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
        "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Subject: Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
Message-ID: <20190603210825.GG4894@linux.intel.com>
References: <960B34DE67B9E140824F1DCDEC400C0F654EB487@ORSMSX116.amr.corp.intel.com>
 <678a37af-797d-7bd5-a406-32548a270e3d@tycho.nsa.gov>
 <CALCETrWXB9fNNDH7gZxPTx05F78Og6K=ZtAr2aA++BDwY09Wbg@mail.gmail.com>
 <c1135352-0b5e-4694-b1a9-105876095877@tycho.nsa.gov>
 <CALCETrWsEXzUC33eJpGCpdMCBO4aYVviZLRD-CLMNaG5Jv-TCA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20190530180110.GB23930@linux.intel.com>
 <CALCETrX2PgUc_jetXHqp85aaS0a0jHB8E7=T1rsW+5vyRgwnUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20190530211645.GB27551@linux.intel.com>
 <CALCETrVAoDppmdJzkpwagt3q64M-QpNajXbKGR1yQdqyofeANQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20190530213601.GC27551@linux.intel.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20190530213601.GC27551@linux.intel.com>
Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo
User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13)
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 02:36:01PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Assuming MRENCLAVE generated by Graphene or any other hosting scheme are
> stable[1], then avoiding EXEC<whatever> means the user can effectively
> whitelist what enclaves are runnable by Graphene, even if the kernel
> doesn't implement security_enclave_create/init().
> 
> I agree that it probably isn't all that important, it's more of a "why
> not" argument, i.e. what is gained by not using sigstruct as a proxy?
> 
> [1] What in the world is being attested if MRENCLAVE isn't stable?

If I've understood correctly, Graphene uses a single loader enclave
that loads the executable in.

/Jarkko