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Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v7 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 13:06:23 -0700 Message-Id: <20190606200646.3951-5-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190606200646.3951-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20190606200646.3951-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Control-flow Enforcement (CET) MSR contents are XSAVES system states. To support CET, introduce XSAVES system states first. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 21 ++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 26 +++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 10 ---- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++---------- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- 8 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h index bcaa4fc54eb5..148a3d8c8c35 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ extern void fpu__save(struct fpu *fpu); extern int fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, int ia32_frame); extern void fpu__drop(struct fpu *fpu); extern int fpu__copy(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src); -extern void fpu__clear(struct fpu *fpu); +extern void fpu__clear_user_states(struct fpu *fpu); +extern void fpu__clear_all(struct fpu *fpu); extern int fpu__exception_code(struct fpu *fpu, int trap_nr); extern int dump_fpu(struct pt_regs *ptregs, struct user_i387_struct *fpstate); @@ -44,7 +45,6 @@ extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); -extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void); /* * Debugging facility: @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static inline void fpstate_init_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave) * XRSTORS requires these bits set in xcomp_bv, or it will * trigger #GP: */ - xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_user; + xsave->header.xcomp_bv = XCOMP_BV_COMPACTED_FORMAT | xfeatures_mask_all; } static inline void fpstate_init_fxstate(struct fxregs_state *fx) @@ -615,6 +615,21 @@ static inline void switch_fpu_finish(struct fpu *new_fpu) __write_pkru(pkru_val); } +/* + * Helpers for changing XSAVES system states. + */ +static inline void modify_fpu_regs_begin(void) +{ + fpregs_lock(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + __fpregs_load_activate(); +} + +static inline void modify_fpu_regs_end(void) +{ + fpregs_unlock(); +} + /* * MXCSR and XCR definitions: */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h index a1e33ebfb13f..2ec19415c58e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h @@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ #define XSAVE_YMM_SIZE 256 #define XSAVE_YMM_OFFSET (XSAVE_HDR_SIZE + XSAVE_HDR_OFFSET) -/* Supervisor features */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) - /* All currently supported features */ #define SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | \ XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | \ @@ -42,6 +39,7 @@ #endif extern u64 xfeatures_mask_user; +extern u64 xfeatures_mask_all; extern u64 xstate_fx_sw_bytes[USER_XSTATE_FX_SW_WORDS]; extern void __init update_regset_xstate_info(unsigned int size, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 466fca686fb9..7a9dcd69580a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -316,12 +316,16 @@ void fpu__drop(struct fpu *fpu) * Clear FPU registers by setting them up from * the init fpstate: */ -static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(void) +static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(u64 features_mask) { fpregs_lock(); + /* + * Only XSAVES user states are copied. + * System states are preserved. + */ if (use_xsave()) - copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, -1); + copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, features_mask); else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR)) copy_kernel_to_fxregs(&init_fpstate.fxsave); else @@ -340,7 +344,21 @@ static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(void) * Called by sys_execve(), by the signal handler code and by various * error paths. */ -void fpu__clear(struct fpu *fpu) +void fpu__clear_user_states(struct fpu *fpu) +{ + WARN_ON_FPU(fpu != ¤t->thread.fpu); /* Almost certainly an anomaly */ + + fpu__drop(fpu); + + /* + * Make sure fpstate is cleared and initialized. + */ + fpu__initialize(fpu); + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)) + copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(xfeatures_mask_user); +} + +void fpu__clear_all(struct fpu *fpu) { WARN_ON_FPU(fpu != ¤t->thread.fpu); /* Almost certainly an anomaly */ @@ -351,7 +369,7 @@ void fpu__clear(struct fpu *fpu) */ fpu__initialize(fpu); if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)) - copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(); + copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(xfeatures_mask_all); } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c index 3271fd8b0322..d9b2e8ec4e4b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c @@ -223,16 +223,6 @@ static void __init fpu__init_system_xstate_size_legacy(void) fpu_user_xstate_size = fpu_kernel_xstate_size; } -/* - * Find supported xfeatures based on cpu features and command-line input. - * This must be called after fpu__init_parse_early_param() is called and - * xfeatures_mask is enumerated. - */ -u64 __init fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void) -{ - return SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK; -} - /* Legacy code to initialize eager fpu mode. */ static void __init fpu__init_system_ctx_switch(void) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c index 2aecbeaaee25..e38b272793b1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)); if (!buf) { - fpu__clear(fpu); + fpu__clear_user_states(fpu); return 0; } @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) err_out: if (ret) - fpu__clear(fpu); + fpu__clear_user_states(fpu); return ret; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c index d503e1fa15e8..6b453455a4f0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c @@ -59,9 +59,19 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { */ u64 xfeatures_mask_user __read_mostly; +/* + * Supported XSAVES system states. + */ +static u64 xfeatures_mask_system __read_mostly; + +/* + * Combined XSAVES system and user states. + */ +u64 xfeatures_mask_all __read_mostly; + static unsigned int xstate_offsets[XFEATURE_MAX] = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1}; static unsigned int xstate_sizes[XFEATURE_MAX] = { [ 0 ... XFEATURE_MAX - 1] = -1}; -static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8]; +static unsigned int xstate_comp_offsets[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_all)*8]; /* * The XSAVE area of kernel can be in standard or compacted format; @@ -86,7 +96,7 @@ void fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(void) */ int cpu_has_xfeatures(u64 xfeatures_needed, const char **feature_name) { - u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask_user; + u64 xfeatures_missing = xfeatures_needed & ~xfeatures_mask_all; if (unlikely(feature_name)) { long xfeature_idx, max_idx; @@ -165,7 +175,7 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu) * None of the feature bits are in init state. So nothing else * to do for us, as the memory layout is up to date. */ - if ((xfeatures & xfeatures_mask_user) == xfeatures_mask_user) + if ((xfeatures & xfeatures_mask_all) == xfeatures_mask_all) return; /* @@ -220,28 +230,27 @@ void fpstate_sanitize_xstate(struct fpu *fpu) */ void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void) { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) || !xfeatures_mask_user) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) || !xfeatures_mask_all) return; /* * XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK sets the features that are managed * by XSAVE{C, OPT} and XRSTOR. Only XSAVE user states can be * set here. */ - - xfeatures_mask_user &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; - cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE); xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user); + + /* + * MSR_IA32_XSS controls which system (not user) states are + * to be managed by XSAVES. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xfeatures_mask_system); } -/* - * Note that in the future we will likely need a pair of - * functions here: one for user xstates and the other for - * system xstates. For now, they are the same. - */ static int xfeature_enabled(enum xfeature xfeature) { - return !!(xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature)); + return !!(xfeatures_mask_all & BIT_ULL(xfeature)); } /* @@ -347,7 +356,7 @@ static int xfeature_is_aligned(int xfeature_nr) */ static void __init setup_xstate_comp(void) { - unsigned int xstate_comp_sizes[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_user)*8]; + unsigned int xstate_comp_sizes[sizeof(xfeatures_mask_all)*8]; int i; /* @@ -420,7 +429,7 @@ static void __init setup_init_fpu_buf(void) print_xstate_features(); if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) - init_fpstate.xsave.header.xcomp_bv = BIT_ULL(63) | xfeatures_mask_user; + init_fpstate.xsave.header.xcomp_bv = BIT_ULL(63) | xfeatures_mask_all; /* * Init all the features state with header.xfeatures being 0x0 @@ -443,7 +452,7 @@ static int xfeature_uncompacted_offset(int xfeature_nr) * format. Checking a system state's uncompacted offset is * an error. */ - if (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR & BIT_ULL(xfeature_nr)) { + if (~xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature_nr)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "No fixed offset for xstate %d\n", xfeature_nr); return -1; } @@ -615,15 +624,12 @@ static void do_extra_xstate_size_checks(void) /* - * Get total size of enabled xstates in XCR0/xfeatures_mask_user. + * Get total size of enabled xstates in XCR0 | IA32_XSS. * * Note the SDM's wording here. "sub-function 0" only enumerates * the size of the *user* states. If we use it to size a buffer * that we use 'XSAVES' on, we could potentially overflow the * buffer because 'XSAVES' saves system states too. - * - * Note that we do not currently set any bits on IA32_XSS so - * 'XCR0 | IA32_XSS == XCR0' for now. */ static unsigned int __init get_xsaves_size(void) { @@ -705,6 +711,7 @@ static int __init init_xstate_size(void) */ static void fpu__init_disable_system_xstate(void) { + xfeatures_mask_all = 0; xfeatures_mask_user = 0; cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE); fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps(); @@ -740,10 +747,23 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) return; } + /* + * Find user states supported by the processor. + * Only these bits can be set in XCR0. + */ cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); xfeatures_mask_user = eax + ((u64)edx << 32); - if ((xfeatures_mask_user & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) { + /* + * Find system states supported by the processor. + * Only these bits can be set in IA32_XSS MSR. + */ + cpuid_count(XSTATE_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + xfeatures_mask_system = ecx + ((u64)edx << 32); + + xfeatures_mask_all = xfeatures_mask_user | xfeatures_mask_system; + + if ((xfeatures_mask_all & XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) != XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE) { /* * This indicates that something really unexpected happened * with the enumeration. Disable XSAVE and try to continue @@ -758,10 +778,12 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) */ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xsave_cpuid_features); i++) { if (!boot_cpu_has(xsave_cpuid_features[i])) - xfeatures_mask_user &= ~BIT_ULL(i); + xfeatures_mask_all &= ~BIT_ULL(i); } - xfeatures_mask_user &= fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(); + xfeatures_mask_all &= SUPPORTED_XFEATURES_MASK; + xfeatures_mask_user &= xfeatures_mask_all; + xfeatures_mask_system &= xfeatures_mask_all; /* Enable xstate instructions to be able to continue with initialization: */ fpu__init_cpu_xstate(); @@ -773,7 +795,7 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) * Update info used for ptrace frames; use standard-format size and no * system xstates: */ - update_regset_xstate_info(fpu_user_xstate_size, xfeatures_mask_user & ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR); + update_regset_xstate_info(fpu_user_xstate_size, xfeatures_mask_user); fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame(); setup_init_fpu_buf(); @@ -781,7 +803,7 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void) print_xstate_offset_size(); pr_info("x86/fpu: Enabled xstate features 0x%llx, context size is %d bytes, using '%s' format.\n", - xfeatures_mask_user, + xfeatures_mask_all, fpu_kernel_xstate_size, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) ? "compacted" : "standard"); return; @@ -801,6 +823,12 @@ void fpu__resume_cpu(void) */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, xfeatures_mask_user); + + /* + * Restore IA32_XSS + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xfeatures_mask_system); } /* @@ -846,9 +874,9 @@ void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr) /* * We should not ever be requesting features that we * have not enabled. Remember that pcntxt_mask is - * what we write to the XCR0 register. + * what we write to the XCR0 | IA32_XSS registers. */ - WARN_ONCE(!(xfeatures_mask_user & BIT_ULL(xfeature_nr)), + WARN_ONCE(!(xfeatures_mask_all & BIT_ULL(xfeature_nr)), "get of unsupported state"); /* * This assumes the last 'xsave*' instruction to @@ -996,7 +1024,7 @@ int copy_xstate_to_kernel(void *kbuf, struct xregs_state *xsave, unsigned int of */ memset(&header, 0, sizeof(header)); header.xfeatures = xsave->header.xfeatures; - header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; + header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask_user; /* * Copy xregs_state->header: @@ -1080,7 +1108,7 @@ int copy_xstate_to_user(void __user *ubuf, struct xregs_state *xsave, unsigned i */ memset(&header, 0, sizeof(header)); header.xfeatures = xsave->header.xfeatures; - header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; + header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask_user; /* * Copy xregs_state->header: @@ -1173,7 +1201,7 @@ int copy_kernel_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void *kbuf) * The state that came in from userspace was user-state only. * Mask all the user states out of 'xfeatures': */ - xsave->header.xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; + xsave->header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask_system; /* * Add back in the features that came in from userspace: @@ -1229,7 +1257,7 @@ int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void __user *ubuf) * The state that came in from userspace was user-state only. * Mask all the user states out of 'xfeatures': */ - xsave->header.xfeatures &= XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR; + xsave->header.xfeatures &= xfeatures_mask_system; /* * Add back in the features that came in from userspace: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 75fea0d48c0e..d360bf4d696b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void flush_thread(void) flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk); memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array)); - fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu); + fpu__clear_all(&tsk->thread.fpu); } void disable_TSC(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c index 364813cea647..3b0dcec597ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs) /* * Ensure the signal handler starts with the new fpu state. */ - fpu__clear(fpu); + fpu__clear_user_states(fpu); } signal_setup_done(failed, ksig, stepping); } -- 2.17.1