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Thu, 06 Jun 2019 17:24:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([167.220.98.69]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id o13sm324179pfh.23.2019.06.06.17.23.59 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 06 Jun 2019 17:23:59 -0700 (PDT) From: Prakhar Srivastava To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, Prakhar Srivastava Subject: [PATCH v7 1/3] Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 17:23:28 -0700 Message-Id: <20190607002330.2999-2-prsriva02@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20190607002330.2999-1-prsriva02@gmail.com> References: <20190607002330.2999-1-prsriva02@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch adds support in ima to measure kexec cmdline args during soft reboot kexec_file_load. - A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the kexec code. - A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure the buffer hash into the ima log. - A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the measurement.[Suggested by Mimi] Hash computation can be tested using sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + include/linux/ima.h | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++ 6 files changed, 91 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index b383c1763610..fc376a323908 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Description: base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index fd9f7cf4cdf5..b42f5a006042 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); +extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) return; } +static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 18b48a6d0b80..a4ad1270bffa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \ hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \ hook(POLICY_CHECK) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \ hook(MAX_CHECK) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 78eb11c7ac07..ea7d8cbf712f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index af341a80118f..e4f301381ffb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -605,6 +605,83 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) return 0; } +/* + * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. + * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. + * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). + * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. + * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation. + * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated. + * + * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. + */ +static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, + const char *eventname, const struct cred *cred, + u32 secid) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; + struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; + struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = iint}; + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; + struct { + struct ima_digest_data hdr; + char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + } hash; + int violation = 0; + int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; + int action = 0; + + action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr, + &template_desc); + if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) + goto out; + + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); + memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); + + event_data.filename = eventname; + + iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr; + iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; + iint->ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; + + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint->ima_hash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + if (action & IMA_MEASURE) + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); + + if (ret < 0) + ima_free_template_entry(entry); + +out: + return; +} + +/** + * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args + * @buf: pointer to buffer + * @size: size of buffer + * + * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. + */ +void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) +{ + u32 secid; + + if (buf && size != 0) { + security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", + current_cred(), secid); + } +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index fd9b01881d17..98e351e13557 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -292,6 +292,13 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; + /* only incase of KEXEC_CMDLINE, inode is NULL */ + if (func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) { + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && + (rule->func == func) && (!inode)) + return true; + return false; + } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -880,6 +887,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0) + entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) -- 2.19.1