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Date:   Tue, 11 Jun 2019 14:34:02 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc:     Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
        Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
        Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/15] x86/alternatives: Teach text_poke_bp() to emulate
 instructions
Message-ID: <20190611123402.GH3463@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
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On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 02:08:34PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 10:03:07AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 07, 2019 at 11:10:19AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
> > > I am surely missing some kprobe context, but is it really safe to use
> > > this mechanism to replace more than one instruction?
> > 
> > I'm not entirely up-to-scratch here, so Masami, please correct me if I'm
> > wrong.
> > 
> > So what happens is that arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe() <-
> > copy_optimized_instructions() copies however much of the instruction
> > stream is required such that we can overwrite the instruction at @addr
> > with a 5 byte jump.
> > 
> > arch_optimize_kprobe() then does the text_poke_bp() that replaces the
> > instruction @addr with int3, copies the rel jump address and overwrites
> > the int3 with jmp.
> > 
> > And I'm thinking the problem is with something like:
> > 
> > @addr: nop nop nop nop nop
> > 
> > We copy out the nops into the trampoline, overwrite the first nop with
> > an INT3, overwrite the remaining nops with the rel addr, but oops,
> > another CPU can still be executing one of those NOPs, right?
> > 
> > I'm thinking we could fix this by first writing INT3 into all relevant
> > instructions, which is going to be messy, given the current code base.
> 
> Maybe not that bad; how's something like this?
> 
> (completely untested)
> 
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index 0d57015114e7..8f643dabea72 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>  #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>  #include <asm/io.h>
>  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
> +#include <asm/insn.h>
>  
>  int __read_mostly alternatives_patched;
>  
> @@ -849,6 +850,7 @@ static void do_sync_core(void *info)
>  
>  static bool bp_patching_in_progress;
>  static void *bp_int3_handler, *bp_int3_addr;
> +static unsigned int bp_int3_length;
>  
>  int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
> @@ -867,7 +869,11 @@ int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	if (likely(!bp_patching_in_progress))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	if (user_mode(regs) || regs->ip != (unsigned long)bp_int3_addr)
> +	if (user_mode(regs))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (regs->ip < (unsigned long)bp_int3_addr ||
> +	    regs->ip >= (unsigned long)bp_int3_addr + bp_int3_length)
>  		return 0;

Bugger, this isn't right. It'll jump to the beginning of the trampoline,
even if it is multiple instructions in, which would lead to executing
instructions twice, which would be BAD.

_maybe_, depending on what the slot looks like, we could do something
like:

	offset = regs->ip - (unsigned long)bp_int3_addr;
	regs->ip = bp_int3_handler + offset;

That is; jump into the slot at the same offset we hit the INT3, but this
is quickly getting yuck.

>  	/* set up the specified breakpoint handler */
> @@ -900,9 +906,12 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(poke_int3_handler);
>  void text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler)
>  {
>  	unsigned char int3 = 0xcc;
> +	void *kaddr = addr;
> +	struct insn insn;
>  
>  	bp_int3_handler = handler;
>  	bp_int3_addr = (u8 *)addr + sizeof(int3);
> +	bp_int3_length = len - sizeof(int3);
>  	bp_patching_in_progress = true;
>  
>  	lockdep_assert_held(&text_mutex);
> @@ -913,7 +922,14 @@ void text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler)
>  	 */
>  	smp_wmb();
>  
> -	text_poke(addr, &int3, sizeof(int3));
> +	do {
> +		kernel_insn_init(&insn, kaddr, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
> +		insn_get_length(&insn);
> +
> +		text_poke(kaddr, &int3, sizeof(int3));
> +
> +		kaddr += insn.length;
> +	} while (kaddr < addr + len);
>  
>  	on_each_cpu(do_sync_core, NULL, 1);
>